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iABSTRACT
A sustainability strategy is a distinctive pattern in an organization’s sustainability
programs that are designed to encourage individuals and organizations to behave in more
sustainable ways. Local governments worldwide have increasingly pursued sustainability
strategies to improve their community health and environment by adopting sustainability
programs that span a variety of environmental issues and use a diverse set of policy
instruments. Despite increasing prevalence of sustainability efforts at the local level, as
yet, there has been little understanding of variation in their sustainability strategies and its
relationship with environmental performance outcomes. Prior research has mainly
focused on the number of programs that local governments adopt and assumed that local
governments with more sustainability programs are more likely to improve the
environment than local governments with fewer programs. However, local governments’
sustainability strategies require more nuanced understanding about variations in their
sustainability programs, in particular across their program design in that a sustainability
strategy relates to both quantity and design aspects of programs.
I address these research gaps in three essays that explore the research question of (1)
how design features of sustainability programs vary across US local governments, (2)
which factors influence variations in program design, (3) how these factors are related to
environmental quality outcomes in communities. By assessing US local governments’
sustainability programs, I found that even for local governments that adopt a same
number of sustainability programs, they design their programs differently, especially
across the breadth of environmental issues that local governments address in their
sustainability programs and the breadth of policy instrument that are used in their
ii
programs. Findings suggest that pressures from external stakeholders and variations in
local governments’ organizational capacities are related to local governments’ decisions
to purse different types of sustainability strategies. Finally, I find that local governments
that design their programs more comprehensively are likely to have greater
environmental performance outcomes in their community. My dissertation expands
existing research in a significant way by focusing on the importance of program design
and its link with improved environmental performance, thereby providing important
implications for distinguishing among local governments’ sustainability strategies.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have underscored the role of local governments in addressing
contemporary environmental issues (John, 1994; Portney, 2003; Stewart & Wiener,
1992)and their voluntary sustainability strategies can be effective at addressing them
(Portney, 2003). Local governments’ sustainability strategy is a distinctive pattern in their
sustainability programs (Sharma, 2000) that usually include a set of incentive-oriented
and information-based tools designed to encourage individuals and organizations to
behave in more sustainable ways (Borck & Coglianese, 2009). Accordingly, local
governments have increasingly adopted a wide array of sustainability programs that span
a variety of environmental issues (Berry & Portney, 2013; Daley, Sharp, & Bae, 2013;
Svara, 2011).
However, these programs differ significantly in their design features. For instance,
local governments have given uneven consideration of the environmental issues that they
address in their sustainability programs (Portney, 2003; Svara, 2011). In other instances,
some local governments have chosen to adopt sustainability programs that heavily
depend on a few types of policy instruments. As such, variations exist in the scope of
environmental issues and their use of policy instruments to address these issues (Daley et
al., 2013; Portney, 2003; Svara, 2011). These design variation may affect their
environmental performance outcomes (Darnall & Kim, 2012; Stewart & Wiener, 1992) in
that more comprehensive programs may have greater potential for improving
environmental conditions (Berry & Portney, 2013; Daley et al., 2013; Darnall & Kim,
2012).The potential has prompted multiple scholars to advocate that local governments
2design their sustainability programs in a comprehensive way (Gunningham & Sinclair,
1999).
Despite increasing scholarly attention, there are at least three gaps in the previous
literature examining local governments’ sustainability programs. First, as yet, I do not
have a good understanding of how local governments’ sustainability programs are
designed, especially across a large number of local governments. Prior research assessing
local governments’ sustainability programs has assumed that local governments with
more sustainability programs are more likely to improve the environment than local
governments with fewer programs (Berry & Portney, 2013; Owen & Videras, 2008;
Portney, 2003; Swann, 2016). However, local governments with the same number of
sustainability programs may design their programs very differently (Dupuis & Biesbroek,
2013). Understanding these variations therefore provide richer explanation about local
governments’ sustainability strategy and may offer more a more accurate way to estimate
their environmental performance outcomes.
A second research gap is that prior research has not identified the factors that
influence local governments to design their sustainability strategies differently. Rather,
scholars have typically regarded these decisions monolithically (Bae & Feiock, 2013)–
either local governments adopt a particular sustainability program or not (Sharp, Daley,
& Lynch, 2010). In other instances, they have assessed how many sustainability
programs that local governments adopt (Hawkins, Krause, Feiock, & Curley, 2016;
Krause, 2011; Portney, 2003; Swann, 2016) as part of their overall sustainability strategy.
However, varying degrees of stakeholder pressures and organizational capacities are
likely to relate to whether or not a local government chooses to adopt a large number of
3sustainability programs. They are also likely to influence whether or not these programs
address a narrow or a broad range of environmental issues.
A third gap relates to the fact that scholarship has not examined the important
question about whether or not local governments’ sustainability programs improve
environmental outcomes. I also do not know how different types of sustainability
strategies relate to environmental performance outcomes. However, knowledge of these
relationships is needed to assist local governments with improving the environmental
conditions of their communities.
I will address each of these questions in three essays. In the first essay, I consider how
local governments’ different postures toward implementing sustainability programs, in
particular exploitative/exploratory postures, lead to variations in two critical design
features that are closely related to environmental performance outcomes: (1) the breadth
of environmental issues and (2) the breadth of policy instrument types. I address
variations in these design features of local governments’ sustainability programs by
empirically assessing 70 local governments’ sustainability programs, the largest
comparative study to date.
In the second essay, I explore how variations in stakeholders’ pressures and internal
organizational capacities are related to different types of local governments’
sustainability strategies. Drawing on strategic management framework assessing
organizations’ environmental strategy, I develop a framework that characterizes four
types of sustainability strategies (reactive, middle group and proactive) based on the
number of sustainability programs they implement and the breadth of environmental
4issues that they address in sustainability programs. I then empirically assess this
framework by examining 1,146 US local governments’ sustainability strategies.
In the third essay, I examine how the design of 102 U.S. county governments’
sustainability programs are related with improved environmental conditions in their
locality between 2003 and 2013. After controlling for the spillover effects of ozone
quality among neighboring counties, I show that greater environmental performance
outcomes were associated with local governments’ sustainability programs that are
designed more comprehensively.
In sum, the results of this research expand existing research in a significant way, and
broaden the discussion about local governments’ sustainability strategies by assessing
their design features, determinants, and environmental performance outcomes.
Knowledge of these different dimensions is essential for understanding why some local
governments’ sustainability strategies are more efficacious than others.
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ALL ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL: ASSESSING THE DESIGN FEATURES OF
LOCAL SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAMS
Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, many local governments have developed a suite of
sustainability programs designed to induce individuals and organizations to collectively
improve communities’ health and environment (Ayre and Callway, 2005). These
programs target a variety of areas, from recycling to utility usage and land development
(Feiock and Coutts, 2013), and have the potential to lead to sweeping shifts in social
norms for environmental protection (Engel, 2006). However, as their prevalence has
increased, so too have questions about program outcomes (Posner and Weisbach, 2010;
Wiener, 2007).
Skepticism exists because some local governments appear to be designing their
sustainability programs in a way that does not ensure improved environmental
performance (Kosloff, Trexler, and Nelson, 2004; Posner and Weisbach, 2010; Wiener,
2007). For example, anecdotal evidence indicates that some local sustainability programs
may require only modest changes in environmental behavior (Kosloff, Trexler, and
Nelson, 2004). Others may require changes that are restricted to a local government’s
internal operations rather than extending their focus to the broader community (Bae and
Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013). Still others may lack long term investments that
improve environmental and social conditions (Camagni, Capello, and Nijkamp, 1998;
Posner and Weisbach, 2010). These more constrained sustainability programs tend to be
low risk in nature in that they emphasize activities with predictable (but modest)
environmental outcomes.
6Prior research assessing the design of local governments’ sustainability programs has
assumed that local governments with more sustainability programs are more likely to
improve the environment than local governments with fewer programs (Berry and
Portney, 2013; de la Cruz, 2009; Owen and Videras, 2008; Portney, 2003; Swann, 2015).
However, local governments with the same number of sustainability programs may
design their programs very differently (Dupuis and Briesbroek, 2013), with some taking a
more exploratory strategy while others take a more exploitative strategy (March, 1991).
Consequently, the environmental outcomes of these sustainability programs may differ
significantly. As yet, researchers lack a good understanding of how local governments’
sustainability programs are designed, especially across a large number of local
governments.
I address these issues by empirically assessing the designs of 70 local governments’
sustainability programs in the United States (U.S.), the largest comparative study to date.
My research question is how local governments’ sustainability strategies lead to
variations in two critical design features that are closely related to environmental
performance outcomes: (1) the breadth of environmental issues and (2) the breadth of
policy instrument types. Findings offer evidence that, although local governments might
adopt the same number of sustainability programs, these programs are designed very
differently. Some local governments design their sustainability programs more narrowly
by focusing on a more limited number of environmental issues (e.g., recycling and
internal government energy use) and constraining their policy instrument types (e.g.,
provision of services and infrastructure upgrade). However, other local governments
design their sustainability programs more broadly by focusing on more environmental
7issues and incorporating more diverse types of policy instruments to address them. The
findings emphasize the importance of sustainability strategies and its connection with
varying program design (Koski, 2007; Kosloff et al., 2004; Krause, 2011). Variations in
the design features reflect local governments’ exploratory/exploitative postures toward
sustainability outcomes in that local governments that design their sustainability
programs more broadly tend to focus on more innovative types of environmental issues
and policy instruments. These design differences may affect local governments’ ability to
improve the natural environment (Koski, 2007). My findings imply an underlying
exploration/innovation proposition faced by local authorities such that local governments
that design their sustainability programs in a more experimental manner incur higher
uncertainty associated with their program benefits in short term. However, the potential
rewards associated with innovative environmental performance outcomes are also likely
to be greater than sustainability programs that are designed more restrictively.
Sustainability strategy and the design of local governments’ sustainability programs
Organizations’ social license to operate depends on the community in which they are
imbedded (Al-Saleh and Mahroum, 2014; Porter and Kramer, 2006, 2010). Addressing
pressures that arise from within the community enhances their long-term viability (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977). In response to increasing stakeholder pressures about environmental
concerns, some organizations adopt sustainability programs (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013;
Engel, 2006). However, implementing these programs comes with high uncertainty in
predicting the effects of their sustainability programs because the cost of implementation
is immediate and tangible, whereas program benefits are often uncertain and intangible
8(Engel and Orbach, 2008; Frame, 2008). Organizations have pursued different strategies
to cope with the uncertainties (March, 1991; Walker, Rahman, and Cave, 2001) that
confront them during designing their sustainability programs,1 with some organizations
pursuing an exploitative strategy and others pursuing an exploratory strategy (Li,
Vanhaverbeke and Schoenmakers, 2007; March, 1991; Moynihan, 2008).
Exploratory and Exploitative Sustainability Strategies
Exploratory strategies emphasize creating new opportunities of organizational
innovation by exploring a variety of alternative (March, 1991; Li, Vanhaverbeke and
Schoenmakers, 2008; Moynihan, 2008). Given the focus on developing innovative
practices, the exploratory strategy focuses on experiment, variation seeking, and new
alternatives, thereby pursuing fundamental and innovative changes (March, 1991).
Related to designing sustainability programs, some local governments seek to be
recognized as sustainability leaders (Ayre and Callway, 2005, 2005) by making
significant strides in improving their environmental quality (Portney, 2003). The
competitive factor causes local governments to design their sustainability programs in a
way that creates significant environmental improvements through innovative change
(Hart and Millstein, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2010). In taking this strategic approach,
local governments not only focus on their internal operation processes, but also extend
their sustainability programs to address the wellbeing of their overall community (Daley
et al., 2013; Porter and Kramer, 2011). This broader focus tends to promote social and
1 Program design is the process by which public managers choose from among a variety of possible options
in order to address a particular problem (Schneider & Sidney, 2009).
9environmental improvements to the broader society while also enhancing the
organization’s reputation within its community and peer networks (Porter and Kramer,
2006). Consequently, sustainability programs that are borne from an exploratory strategy
tend to pursue long-term benefits (as opposed to short-term wins) (Hart and Millstein,
2003; Porter and Kramer, 2006, 2011) that may include improvements to human health
and well-being, social vitality, and resource efficiency (Fiorino, 2010). However, because
of their more experimental approach, organizations that pursue an exploratory strategy
also tend to incur greater uncertainty in developing their sustainability programs (Hart
and Millstein, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2006) in that their program benefits are often
less certain, less immediate, and more diffuse (Li et al., 2008; March, 1991; Moynihan,
2008).
Exploitative strategies are developed, not because of competitive factors, but in an
effort to reduce uncertainty (March, 1991) associated with generating program benefits
(March, 1991; Li et al., 2008). Given its focus on reliability of program benefits (March,
1991), organizations that pursue an exploitative strategy tend to focus on a limited range
of alternative rather than seeking a variety of options (March, 1991; Li et al., 2008). The
essence of exploitative strategy is refinement and extension of existing competences and
practices, thereby ensuring positive, proximate, and predictable program benefits (March,
1991). Related to designing sustainability programs, local governments that pursue an
exploitative strategy are more likely to design programs that address peripheral
environmental issues (Hart and Millstein, 2003; Maak, 2008) with predictable, but
modest, outcomes (Posner and Weisbach, 2010; Wiener, 2007) rather than focusing on
complex sustainability concerns that require fundamental changes and extensive
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implementation efforts (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Their programs are likely to be limited
to improving the organization’s internal operating processes (Bae and Feiock, 2013;
Daley et al., 2013) because they are practically feasible and show immediate benefits
(Yanarella and Levine, 2008). This narrower approach tends to emphasize short-term
environmental improvements (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) that focus on enhancing an
organization’s internal efficiencies (Dupuis and Briesbroek, 2013; Porter and Kramer,
2010) through activities such as improved resource use (Yanarella and Levine, 2008).
Because of each of these factors, sustainability programs borne from an exploitative
strategy are designed to accrue more short-term, certain benefits and are less focused on
the long-term (Michaels, 2008).
Despite the important distinctions among organizations’ sustainability strategies, there
has been very little knowledge about the design features of local governments’
sustainability programs. Prior research has assumed that local governments with a greater
number of sustainability programs are more likely to improve the environment, yet local
governments with the same number of sustainability programs may design their programs
differently, with some taking a more exploratory strategy and others taking a more
exploitative strategy (March, 1991). Understanding these important design distinctions is
critical for understanding whether local governments’ sustainability programs are more
likely to improve environmental outcomes (Carley and Miller, 2012; Koski, 2007;
Krause, 2011).
I suggest that two design variations are particularly salient to local governments’
pursuit of an exploitative versus exploratory sustainability strategy as they are related to
policy ends and means respectively (Howlett, 2009): the breadth of environmental issues
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that the programs address (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Stead and Meijers, 2009; Stewart
and Wiener, 1992; Underdal, 1980) and the breadth of policy instruments that the
programs use individually or jointly to achieve their sustainability objectives (Simons et
al., 1999; Sovacool, 2009; Stewart and Wiener, 1992). Both concepts are discussed in the
following sections.
Breadth of Environmental Issues
Breadth of environmental issues is defined as all possible sources that affect
environmental quality (Stewart and Wiener, 1992). As part of its overall sustainability
strategy, a local government must assess which environmental issues it will address,
which requires an understanding of the pollutants and sources of pollution within their
jurisdictions (Lafeerty and Hovden, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 1992)2. While local
governments are motivated to address environmental issues to achieve broad societal
benefits, addressing some environmental issues present more certain economic benefits to
local governments (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013). For instance, addressing
environmental issues of recycling and resource efficiency within internal government
facilities provide more certain economic benefits (e.g., operation cost savings) (Daley et
al., 2013; Yanarella and Levine, 2008), whereas addressing environmental issues of air,
water, and alternative energy present relatively less certain economic benefits (Bae and
Feiock, 2013; Sharp et al., 2011). Addressing the environmental issues associated with
high level of economic benefits often present more predictable, immediate, and tangible
2 For instance, a local government may identify carbon emissions as an environmental pollutant within its
jurisdiction. Sources of that carbon may include energy usage within government facilities, businesses and
residential homes, and automobiles.
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payoffs to local governments (Yanarella and Levine, 2008), thereby increasing reliability
of sustainability program benefits.
Local governments that pursue an exploratory strategy are likely to address a greater
breadth of environmental issues ranged from those presenting high level of economic
benefits to those presenting low level of economic benefits. Because of their more
experimental focus, these governments tend to address complex environmental issues that
require fundamental changes in both their organizational operations (Yanarella and
Levine, 2008; Daley et al., 2013) and community engagement (Bae and Feiock, 2013).
They explore a variety of environmental issues by adopting a holistic approach,
integrating all their related environmental issues, and establishing multiple pathways to
address them (Lafeerty and Hovden, 2003; Stead and Meijers, 2009; Underdal, 1980).
Although some environmental issues do not generate tangible and certain economic
benefits immediately, by addressing a greater breadth of environmental issues, local
governments can achieve greater (and more long-term) environmental improvements
while also enhancing social wellbeing and economic growth in long-term (Florida, 2003).
By contrast, local governments that pursue an exploitative strategy are more likely to
design their sustainability programs around the environmental issues that are more likely
to provide high level of economic benefits. In determining which environmental issues to
emphasize, these governments focus on environmental issues affecting their internal
operations (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013) or environmental issues that are
less complex (such as energy consumption related to lighting) and do not lead to
fundamental changes in their organizational operations. Consistent with pursuing an
exploitative strategy, addressing these issues is more practically feasible and less
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expensive to implement (Yanarella and Levine, 2008), but still offer short-term economic
benefits (Moffet, Bregha and Middelkoop, 2004). Therefore, as they seek for greater
certainty in predicting program benefits (Daley et al., 2013; Yanarella and Levine, 2008),
the breadth of environmental issues that they address become narrower and to be
restricted to the environmental issues with high level of economic benefits.
Proposition 1. Local governments that design sustainability strategies around a
narrower breadth of environmental issues emphasize environmental impacts with more
certain economic benefits than local governments that design sustainability strategies
around a broader breadth of environmental issues.
Breadth of Policy Instruments
Policy instruments are identifiable methods that influence individuals or organizations
to behave in responsible ways in order to improve a social outcome (Schneider and
Ingram, 1993). The breadth of a local government’s policy instruments is defined as the
diversity of policy approaches used to address a particular social concern (Sovacool,
2009; Stern, 2000). For last decades, environmental policy instruments have been
increasingly diversified as they have evolved (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999) from the
first generation of direct government intervention (e.g., regulations, direct provision of
services/infrastructure) (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito, 2005) to the second generation of
market-oriented instruments to the third generation of social controls (Long, 1997) 3. The
3 In the 1970s, the first generation of command and control regulation had focused on the “one-size-fits-all”
prescriptive approach (Gaines & Katz, 2002, p. 843). While it improved the quality of our air and water and
land (Hirsch, 2010; Stewart & Wiener, 1992; Woods & Potoski, 2010), it failed to encourage the
development of pollution prevention efforts by industry and individuals (Fiorino, 2004) as there is no
reward for going further, and hence no incentive to prevent potential issues that are not yet covered by
current regulation (Fiorino, 2004; Hirsch, 2010). In the mid 1980s, the market-oriented environmental
policy emerged as the second generation of environmental policy in order to address these critics on the
unidirectional government intervention (Fiorino, 1999; Hatch, 2005; Stewart, 1992). Environmental policy
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newer the environmental policy instruments, the less intervening to business and
individual citizens (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Jordan et al., 2005). While each
policy instrument has its own strengths and weakness (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998,
1999), the first generation of policy instruments often have well proven policy effects, fix
problems quickly, and therefore present high level of assurance that the objective will be
achieved (Long, 1997), whereas the newer generation of policy instruments are more
flexible, experimental and innovative (Jordan et al., 2005). Local sustainability programs
utilize a variety of policy instruments to influence individuals’ and organizations’
behaviors (Daley et al., 2013; Krause, 2011), and the first generation of policy
instruments has remained a main tool of choice for governments due to the high level of
certainty (Long, 1997) .
Local governments that pursue an exploratory strategy are likely to use a broader
spectrum of policy instruments ranged from the first generation to the third generation.
Given the emphasis on experimentation with new alternatives (March, 1991), they not
only depend on the traditional policy instruments, but also seek for novel policy
instruments that may work through more indirect policy mechanisms of economic and
social control (Jacobsen, Kotchen, and Clendenning, 2013; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). For
of the second generation includes pollution fees, tradable permit system, and various market incentives
(Stewart, 1992).The market-oriented policy instruments give polluting entities the incentive to ask whether
there might be a better way to improve environmental quality other than producing environmental pollution
(Crawford-Brown & Crawnford-Brown, 2011). Therefore, this generation of environmental policy gives
private industries market incentives and flexibility to devise environmental programs that fit to their
businesses. Finally, by the 1990s, U.S. policy makers have begun to search the third generation of
environmental policy (Fiorino, 1999; Long, 1997). In search of more effective prevention strategy,
government, industry and civil society have begun to experiment with more governance-oriented approach
(Jordan et al., 2005), including voluntary initiatives, such as green procurement, third party certification
and education programs (Kerr et al., 1998). The third generation of environmental policy instrument
focuses on changing public attitudes and transforming economic structure that indirectly encourage
business and individuals to behave more sustainable ways (Long, 1997).
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instance, in order to encourage individuals and organizations to engage in pro-
environmental behaviors (e.g., energy savings, vehicle use reduction, recycling), local
governments pursuing an exploratory strategy not only use policy instruments that
directly induce their behavior change by providing legal, physical and administrative
assistances (e.g., legal limits, infrastructure and public services), but also utilize the
policy instruments that indirectly influence them by changing prices of the behaviors
(e.g., tax incentives, charges) and socially constructed norms toward the behavior (e.g.,
education, voluntary agreement). By using multiple set of policy instruments, the
sustainability programs that born from this exploratory strategy are more likely to shape
(or constrain) individual behaviors or perceptions over time (Dietz and Stern, 2002;
McKenzie-Mohr, 2000) as well as encourage immediate behavior changes (Kollmuss and
Agyeman, 2002). Despite the more experimental trials, this more integrative approach
tends to encourage individuals and organizations to sustain their behavior changes for a
long time (Yanarella and Levine, 2008), thereby inducing more fundamental (and
innovative) as well as long-term improvements in environmental and social conditions.
By contrast, local governments that pursue an exploitative strategy may tend to design
their sustainability program around the first generation of environmental policy
instruments. Compared to other types of policy instruments, the first generation of policy
instruments ensure greater certainty of policy effects even if it is modest (Long, 1997)
because of their longer history of implementation. Instead of adopting a variety set of
policy instruments, an exploitative strategy tends to emphasize a few selected alternatives
for policy instruments that have greater certainty related to program benefits
(Matland ,1995), and can ensure the delivery of short-term benefits (Yanarella and
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Levine, 2008), even if small. Therefore, as they seek for greater certainty in predicting
effects of policy instruments, the breadth of policy instruments that they utilize to achieve
the policy goal become narrower and to be restricted to the more traditional policy
instruments.
Proposition 2. Local governments that design sustainability strategies around a
narrower breadth of policy instruments emphasize environmental impacts with more
traditional policy instruments than local governments that design sustainability
strategies around a broader breadth of environmental issues.
Comparative Analysis of US Local Sustainability Program design
Data
To assess the design of local sustainability programs, I rely on the data from the 2010
International City/County Management Association (ICMA)’s Local Government
Sustainability Policies and Programs survey. The survey was developed with the input of
ICMA’s Center for Sustainable Communities and other research institutes (ICMA, 2010)
and asked local governments’ sustainability managers about their jurisdiction’s
sustainability programs. In the summer of 2010, the survey was mailed to sustainability
managers of total 8,569 local governments including county and municipal governments.
Local governments that did not respond to the first survey received a follow-up reminder.
Total 2,176 (25.39%) local governments – 1,874 municipalities and 302 counties –
responded (Svara, 2011). Sustainability managers were provided with a list of 119
sustainability programs, and for each of the 119 programs, respondents were asked to
indicate which actions their local government had taken. Respondents reported ‘Yes’ (1)
or ‘No’ (0) for presence of each sustainability program.
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ICMA data provides at least three merits to the research examining US local
governments’ sustainability effort. First, it includes the most comprehensive array of
sustainability programs currently in use at the local level (Svara, 2011). While previous
literature examined US local governments’ sustainability programs by relying on other
survey data (Berry and Portney, 2013; Bae and Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013; Hwakins
et al., 2015), they are either limited to a certain environmental area (e.g., energy) (Bae
and Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013) or include a less comprehensive list of
sustainability programs (Hawkins et al., 2015; Portney, 2003). Second, it includes the
largest number of local governments across entire Unites States. Despite the relatively
low response rate, the date still includes 2,176 observations, the largest set of local
government to my knowledge, including all types of local governments, such as counties,
cities, and townships. Finally, ICMA is one of the most influential associations for US
local governments (Svara, 2011), which makes local governments to respond in a more
reliable manner.
Measuring Breadth of Environmental Issues
To measure the breadth of local governments’ environmental issues addressed in their
sustainability programs, the ICMA survey divided 119 sustainability programs along
eight environmental impacts: air, water, recycling, energy conservation, buildings, land
use, transportation, and social inclusion4.
4 For more details about the structure of the survey, a summary of the survey questionnaire is available at
file:///C:/Users/Hyunjung/Downloads/ICMA%202010%20Sustainability%20Survey%20Summary.pdf.
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The eight aggregate environmental issues were disaggregated based on their specific
goals and target populations. For example, energy conservation programs were
disaggregated based on their pollution source as sustainability programs that address
more pollution sources have greater breadth (Daley et al., 2013). This step led to the
generation of five types of energy items: energy in government, energy in residential
homes, energy in business, energy in outdoor lights/vehicles, and alternative energy
generation. Similarly, the aggregate category of transportation was disaggregated into
three types of transportation items based on their pollution source: public transportation,
reduced commute trips (e.g., telework, compressed work week), and alternative modes of
vehicles (e.g., walk, bike). After disaggregation, I identified 14 environmental issues: air,
water, recycling, energy in government, energy in residential homes, energy in business,
energy in outdoor lights/vehicles, alternative energy generation, public transportation,
reduced commute trips, alternative modes of vehicles, green building/construction,
sustainable land use, and social inclusion.
I then categorized these environmental issues according to the potential of providing
economic benefits to local governments: low, medium, and high level of economic
benefits. First of all, recycling, energy in government, and energy in outdoor
lights/vehicles (e.g., street lights, traffic signals) could be categorized into the high level
of economic benefit because they are related to reducing government operation cost
savings (Daley et al., 2013; Yanarella and Levine, 2008). On the other hand,
environmental issues of air, water, alternative energy, and social inclusion could be
categorized into the low level of economic benefit because they often create high level of
spill-over effects, which make their economic effects more uncertain and diffuse (Sharp
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et al., 2011; Yanarella and Levine, 2008). Finally, environmental issues related to energy
in residential homes and business, transportation, and land use may fall into the grey area
where economic benefits are somewhat expected, but less tangible and immediate than
these issues of recycling and energy saving in government. Therefore, I categorized the
remaining environmental issues into the medium level of economic benefit category.
Each local government’s breadth of environmental issues was measured by the extent
to which their sustainability programs were broadly distributed across these 14
environmental issues. In finalizing the measure for breadth of environmental issues, I
utilized Shannon’s H entropy score (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). Shannon’s H entropy
score is one of the most widely used measures for breadth or diversity of items because it
is sensitive to high levels of scope and therefore leads to wider variation than other types
of breadth measures (e.g. Herphindal HirschmanIndex) (Halpin & Thomas, 2012).
Shannon’s H entropy score takes the following form:
E = P ∗ ln(1/P )
where Pj is a proportion of sustainability programs addressing jth environmental issue in
total adopted sustainable programs, the logarithm of 1/Pj is a weight of each proportion
and m is the number of total available environmental issues, which is in this case 14.
Local governments whose sustainability programs address a greater breadth of
environmental issues therefore receive a higher the entropy score (EE).
As a complementary measure, I also multiplied the number of each local governments’
sustainability programs with its entropy score. This second measure accounted for the
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quantity of local governments’ sustainability programs in addition to the distribution of
environmental issues that they address (Halpin & Thomas, 2012).
Number ∗ E = Sustainability programs ∗ P ∗ ln(1P)
Table 2.1 offers examples of four selected local governments to illustrate measures for
the breadth of environmental issues. Each of the local governments in the first two
columns, City of Cozad in NE and Village of Skaneateles in NY, implemented 10
sustainability programs. However, the breadth of environmental issues addressed in City
of Cozad’s sustainability programs is more constrained than Village of Skaneateles’s, as
evidenced by City of Cozad’s entropy score of 0.77, compared to Village of
Skaneateles’s entropy score of 1.79. The differences in entropy scores reflect the fact that
Village of Skaneateles’ sustainability programs are more evenly distributed across the 14
environmental issues, whereas City of Cozad’s sustainability programs are more heavily
concentrated one environmental issue (energy saving in governments). In considering my
second measure of breadth of environmental issues, which accounts for the quantity of
local governments’ sustainability programs in addition to the distribution of
environmental issues that they address, Village of Skaneateles’s score is 17.89, compared
to City of Cozad’s score of 7.72. From the variation in the breadth of environmental
issues between City of Cozad’s and Village of Skaneateles’s sustainability programs, I
can infer that these local governments may pursue different sustainability strategies in
determining environmental issues to address in their sustainability programs. City of
Cozad’s sustainability programs are more likely to concentrate to environmental issues
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that present high level of economic benefits, whereas Village of Skaneateles’s
sustainability programs that are designed more broadly across all environmental issues.
City of Arlington in WA and City of Mercer Island in WA illustrate a similar pattern
but for cities that implemented a large number (i.e., 38) of sustainability programs. City
of Arlington’s sustainability programs are designed less broadly across environmental
issues compared to City of Mercer Island’s programs. City of Arlington’s sustainability
programs are constrained to a smaller number of environmental issues, in particular those
with high level of economic benefits, whereas City of Mercer Island has a broader focus,
which is reflected in their entropy scores (2.79 and 3.53, respectively). Similar
differences are seen when the number of each city’s sustainability programs is multiplied
by its entropy score. City of Arlington’s score is 106.36 and City of Mercer Island score
is 134.05, which may reflect a more certain economic benefit-focused approach
associated with City of Arlington’s sustainability programs.
Table 2.1
Four exemplary cases of the breadth of environmental issue: Number of sustainability
programs across 14 environmental issues
Environmental Issues Cozad
, NE
Skaneateles
, NY
Arlington
, WA
Mercer
Island,
WA
Low level of
economic benefits
Total (n=31) 2 4 9 12
Air quality(n=8) -- 1 1 4
Water saving and quality(n=6) -- 1 5 4
Alternative energy (n=9) -- 1 -- 0
Social Inclusion (n=8) 2 1 3 4
Total (n=63) 0 3 14 13
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Medium level of
economic benefits
Energy use in Residents(n=13) -- 1 1 2
Energy use in Business(n=12) -- -- -- --
Public transportation
improvements(n=5)
-- -- 1 2
Reduced commute trips (n=6) -- -- 4 4
Alternative modes of transportation
(n=7)
-- 1 4 --
Green building and construction
(n=7)
-- -- 2 2
Density and Sustainable
development(n=13)
-- 1 2 3
High level of
economic benefits
Total (n=25) 8 3 15 13
Energy use in Governments(n=6) -- 1 6 4
Energy use in Outdoor
light/vehicles(n=9)
7 1 2 3
Recycling(n=10) 1 1 7 6
# of sustainability programs (n=119) 10 10 38 38
Breadth of environmental issues (EE) 0.77 1.79 2.79 2.3.53
Number * EE 7.72 17.89 106.36 134.05
Note: Average score of the breadth of environmental issues of 2,176 local governments is 1.77, and its
standard deviation is 0.54. US local governments implement 17.94 sustainability programs on average, and
standard deviation is 12.41, which is ranged from the minimum, 0, to the maximum 76.
Measuring Breadth of Policy Instruments
To measure the breadth of local governments’ policy instruments used in their
sustainability programs, I identified all the available types of policy instruments
comprising the 119 programs in the 2010 ICMA survey. As the ICMA survey did not
categorize the 119 sustainability programs according to policy instrument types, I
established a typology of policy instruments drawing on prior research categorizing
policy instrument types in the local sustainability program context (Bengston, Fletcher,
and Nelson, 2004; Cubbage, Harou, and Sills, 2007; Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001; Dietz,
Ostrom, and Stern, 2003; Li & Geiser, 2005). In categorizing policy instrument types,
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previous studies have commonly focused on the mechanism through which a policy
instrument influences individual or organizational behaviors (Kaufmann-Hayoz et al.,
2001; Dietz and Stern, 2002; Li and Geiser, 2005). Based on the policy mechanism
criteria, I identified 12 types of policy instruments: voluntary agreement, provision of
service, establishment of new infrastructure, infrastructure upgrade, tax benefits, direct
financial payment, reduced fees, other incentives, charges, limit, education, and green
procurement. Although these policy instruments are not completely mutually exclusive
(Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001), each policy instrument can be considered a distinctive
type because each one depends on a different mechanism to influence behaviors.
Moreover, these policy instruments could be categorized into different generations of
environmental policy instruments (Jordan et al., 2005; Long, 1997). Definitions and the
mechanisms of each policy instrument type by different generations are discussed below.
First of all, limits, direct provision of service and infrastructure could be categorized
as the first generation of environmental policy instrument (Long, 1997) in that they are
heavily depend on government’s unidirectional intervention (Jordan et al., 2005).
Limits or requirements mandate some forms of behaviors or specific outcomes of
actions by way of strong commitment to legal orders (Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001).
Examples from the ICMA list include land use requirements in urban planning, zoning
codes to restrict certain development, and limits on impervious surfaces on private
property.
Provision of service refers to providing practices, procedures, or actions that enable
individuals or organizations to achieve the desired outcomes (Kaufmann-Hayoz et al.,
2001). Local governments often transform and/or establish public services that assist or
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promote certain environmentally sustainable behaviors (Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001).
Examples from the ICMA list include e-waste collection services, commuter rail systems,
energy audit services, and the provision of alternative work options to public employees
(e.g., compressed workweek, telework).
Infrastructure is “man-made, mobile or immobile physical objects that shape the
actor’s scope of opportunities for action” (Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001, p.39). Related
to sustainability programs, local governments create physical conditions that enable or
promote sustainable behaviors among individuals or organizations by establishing new
infrastructures (Dietz and Stern, 2002). Examples drawn from the ICMA list include
establishing bike lanes or sidewalks, installing charging station for electric vehicles, and
installing new outdoor light fixtures. Local governments could also improve physical
conditions by upgrading infrastructures (Dietz & Stern, 2002). Examples of the
infrastructure upgrade from the ICMA list include retrofitting streetlights or traffic
signals, upgrading facilities’ water or sewer systems, and widening sidewalks.
Second, tax benefits, direct financial payments, reduced fees, other incentives,5 and
charges are variants of economic instruments (Bengston, Fletcher, and Nelson, 2004;
Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001), all of which could be categorized into the second
generation of environmental policy instruments (Jordan et al., 2005; Long, 1997).
5 Other incentives are not drawn from a theoretical typology, but a category for the empirical measures.
From the ICMA list of sustainability programs, 10 sustainability programs are described as incentives, but
do not include details about specific types of incentives. Examples include density incentives, incentives
for other than density for LEED-certified commercials, incentives for other than density for LEED-certified
single-family residential facilities, incentives for water conservation, incentives for public employees for
taking mass transit to work, carpool, walk, or bike, incentives for sustainable development, and financial
support/incentives for affordable housing.
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Tax benefits are tax deductions or exemptions for certain activities or services
(Cubbage, Harou, and Sills, 2007). Related to sustainability programs, tax benefits
encourage pro-environmental behaviors by reducing the cost of the behaviors at the
margin (Braun, 2007), such as tax credits for residents or businesses who conduct energy
audits or weatherization for their houses or buildings (ICMA). Direct financial payment
refers to the direct provision of financial subsidies to individuals and organizations
(Cubbage, Harou, and Sills, 2007), and it also provides individuals and organizations
with economic incentives to engage in pro-environmental behaviors (Cubbage, Harou,
and Sills, 2007; Sussman, 2007). Examples from the ICMA list include direct grants,
direct loans for home audits, and the provision of funding for preschool education.
Reducing fees encourages individual behaviors by reducing the costs of the pro-
environmental behaviors through discounted prices or fees associated with the behaviors
other than tax incentives (Bengston et al., 2004; Dietz & Stern, 2002). The ICMA
examples include the purchase of development rights to preserve open spaces, or
reducing fees for environmentally friendly development. Charges are prices imposed for
utilizing public services or the privilege of engaging in certain activities (Kaufmann-
Hayoz et al., 2001). They focus on discouraging individual or organizational behaviors
by raising the costs of polluting behaviors (Bengston et al., 2004; Dietz & Stern, 2002).
Examples from the ICMA list include water price structures to encourage conservation,
charges based on the amount of waste discarded, or charging market rates for public
employee parking to discourage commuting.
Finally, voluntary agreements, education, and green procurement are characterized as
less intervening policy instruments (Jordan et al., 2005) in that they influence institutional
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norms, public attitudes, and market drivers as policy mechanisms. Therefore, they could
be categorized into the third generation of environmental policy instrument (Long, 1997).
Voluntary agreements are legally non-binding commitments made by organizations to
achieve certain objectives or take certain measures (Dietz & Stern, 2002; Kaufmann-
Hayoz et al., 2001). Voluntary agreements provide local governments and community
members with strategic orientation toward the declared sustainability goal that they
should achieve through their collective efforts (Kemp, 2000). Examples from the ICMA
list are agreements on energy efficiency rates, greenhouse gas emission targets, and
consumption goals or standards to achieve.
Education is an information-based instrument that influences individuals’ beliefs,
knowledge, and beliefs in social norms (Dietz & Stern, 2002; Kaufmann-Hayoz et al.,
2001; Schultz, 2002) by informing, educating, or communicating (Kaufmann-Hayoz et
al., 2001, p.48). Examples from the ICMA list include education programs dealing with
energy conservation and reports published on a community’s quality of life indicators.
Green procurement refers to public organizations’ purchasing of products and
services (Li and Geiser, 2005). Local governments incorporate sustainability criteria in
their purchasing decisions, which is called sustainable procurement (Li and Geiser, 2005;
Stevens, 2010). By purchasing environmentally friendly products or services (e.g., office
supplies made from recycled materials, energy-efficient appliances or equipment, and
electricity generated from renewable energy sources) (Stevens, 2010), local governments
not only increase resource efficiency from an organization’s internal operations and
public service deliveries, but also drive the force for markets toward environmentally
friendly products and services (Li and Geiser, 2005). Examples from the ICMA list
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include green product purchasing programs, the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles, and
restrictions on the purchase of bottled water by governments.
By relying on the definitions and descriptions of the policy instrument types, I
identified a policy instrument type for each of the 119 sustainability programs. Eight
sustainability programs were excluded from measuring the breadth of policy instruments
because they were not described sufficiently for us to determine their policy instrument
types. I thus categorized 111 (of 119) sustainability programs into the 12 types of policy
instruments.
Each local government’s breadth of policy instruments was measured by the extent to
which their sustainability programs were broadly distributed across these 12 types of
policy instrument. I utilized Shannon’s H entropy score (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979) to
measure the breadth of policy instruments. The measure takes the following form:
E = P ∗ ln(1/P )
where Pk is a proportion of sustainability programs addressing kth type of policy
instrument in total adopted sustainable programs, the logarithm of 1/Pk is a weight of
each proportion and l is the number of total available policy instrument types, which is in
this case 12. Local governments whose sustainability programs address a greater breadth
of policy instruments therefore receive a higher the entropy score (EP).
As a second measure, I also used multiplied the number of each local governments’
sustainability programs with its entropy score. This measure accounted for the quantity of
local governments’ sustainability programs in addition to the distribution of policy
instruments that they use (Halpin & Thomas, 2012).
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Number ∗ E = Sustainability programs ∗ P ∗ ln( 1P )
Similar to Table 3.1, Table 3.2 provides examples of four selected local governments
to illustrate the measures for the breadth of policy instruments. Each of the local
governments in the first two columns, City of Cozad in NE and City of Colorado in TX,
implemented 10 sustainability programs. However, the breadth of policy instruments
used by City of Cozad’s sustainability programs is more restricted than City of
Colorado’s, as evidenced by City of Cozad’s entropy score of 0.96, compared to City of
Colorado’s entropy score of 1.97. The differences in entropy scores reflect the fact that
City of Colorado’s sustainability programs are more evenly distributed across the 12
policy instruments, whereas City of Cozad’s sustainability programs are more heavily
concentrated on one policy instrument (i.e., provision of services). In considering the
second measure of the breadth of policy instruments, which accounts for the quantity of
local governments’ sustainability programs in addition to the distribution of policy
instruments that they use, City of Colorado’s score is 19.74, compared to City of Cozad’s
score of 9.57. From the difference in the breadth of policy instruments between City of
Cozad’s and City of Colorado’s sustainability programs, I can infer that these local
governments may pursue different sustainability strategies in selecting policy instruments
to use in their sustainability programs. City of Cozad’s sustainability programs are more
likely to concentrate to the first generation of policy instruments, whereas City of
Colorado’s programs are more broadly distributed across all types of policy instruments.
City of Redding in CA and City of Long Beach in CA illustrate a similar pattern, but
for cities that implemented a large number (i.e., 38) of sustainability programs. City of
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Redding’s sustainability programs are designed less broadly across policy instruments
compared to City of Long Beach’s programs. City of Redding’s sustainability programs
are constrained to a smaller number of policy instruments, whereas City of Long Beach
has a broader focus, as evidence by their entropy scores: 1.65 and 2.68, respectively.
Similar differences are seen when the number of each city’s sustainability programs is
multiplied by its entropy score. City of Redding’s score is 62.82, and City of Long
Beach’s score is 102.01, which may reflect a more traditional policy instrument-focused
approach associated with City of Redding’s sustainability programs.
Table 2.2
Four exemplary cases of the breadth of policy instruments: Number of sustainability
programs across 12 policy instruments
Policy Instrument Types Cozad,
NE
Colorado,
TX
Redding,
CA
Long
Beach,
CA
3rd generation of
environmental
policy instruments
Total (n=19) 0 1 4 12
Voluntary agreement (n=8) -- 1 -- 3
Education (n=2) -- -- 2 2
Green procurement (n=9) -- -- 2 7
2nd generation of
environmental
policy instruments
Total (n=49) 1 5 9 6
Tax benefits (n=11) -- -- -- --
Direct payment (n=21) -- 2 6 --
Reducing fees (n=4) -- 1 -- 1
Other incentive(n=10) -- 1 3 4
Charges (n=3) 1 1 -- 1
1st generation of
environmental
policy instruments
Total (n=43) 9 4 25 20
Limit (n=9) -- 1 4 2
Provision of  service(n=18) 8 1 11 9
Infrastructure Upgrade (n=10) 1 -- 2 3
Infrastructure Establish (n=6) -- 2 8 6
Number of sustainability programs (n=111) 10 10 38 38
30
Breadth of policy instrument (EP) 0.96 1.97 1.65 2.68
Number * EP 9.57 19.74 62.82 102.01
Note: Average score of the breadth of policy instruments of 2,176 local governments is 1.35, and its
standard deviation is 0.45. US local governments implement 17.94 sustainability programs on average, and
standard deviation is 12.41, which is ranged from the minimum, 0, to the maximum 76.
Empirical Analysis
To assess Propositions 1 and 2, I created two groups of local governments according
to their entropy scores: those with exploitative and exploratory strategies. To create these
two groups, I first limited local governments to those that have a similar number of
sustainability programs because my research focused on how local governments design
their programs differently despite a similar number of sustainability programs. I limited
local governments to those with more than 26 sustainability programs (which is 75th
percentile of the number of sustainability programs) or fewer than 30 sustainability
programs (which is about 80th percentile of the number of sustainability programs).
I focused on local governments adopting a large set of sustainability programs. First,
they are leading actors in adopting more sustainability programs than others. By
categorizing these local governments by the design features of their sustainability
programs, I identify genuinely proactive local governments that adopt not only more
sustainability programs, but also design them more comprehensively than other local
governments. Second, local governments with a large set of sustainability programs may
have greater flexibility in designing their programs across various environmental issues
and policy instrument types than those that have only a few or a modest number of
sustainability programs. Given the greater flexibility, I may be able to identify local
governments that adopt a large number of sustainability programs while failing to design
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them with sufficient policy designs that relate to substantial improvements in
environmental performance. As I limited local governments to those between the 75th
and 80th percentile in terms of their number of sustainability programs, 140 local
governments were selected to create local governments with the exploitative and
exploratory strategies.
To test proposition 1, I categorized the selected local governments into exploitative
and exploratory strategy categories based on their entropy score for breadth of
environmental issues (EE). If the EE was in the bottom 25% (lower than 25th percentile),
the local governments were categorized in the exploitative sustainability strategy group;
these local governments’ sustainability programs address a narrower array of
environmental issues than other local governments’ programs despite a similar number of
programs. Meanwhile, local governments with the exploratory sustainability strategy
were in the top 25% (greater than 75th percentile) for EE.
To test proposition 2, I created another set of exploitative and exploratory strategy
categories for local governments based on the entropy score of the breadth of policy
instruments (EP). When EP was in the bottom 25% (lower than 25th percentile), the local
government was categorized in the exploitative sustainability strategy group; these local
governments’ sustainability programs use a narrower set of policy instruments than other
local governments’ programs despite a similar number of programs. Local governments
whose EP was in the top 25% (greater than 75th percentile) were categorized in the
exploratory sustainability strategy group.
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Using these two sets of local governments with low- and high-entropy scores6, I then
conducted t-tests to compare how the similar number of sustainability programs were
designed across environmental issues and policy instrument types between these two
groups of local governments.
Results
Table 2.3 presents average number of sustainability programs across 14 environmental
issues among the low-and high-entropy score (EE) groups, which represent local
governments with the exploitative and exploratory strategy respectively.
The results of the t-test indicated that total number of sustainability programs between
the low-and high- entropy groups are statistically similar, 27.34 and 27.53 respectively.
However, variations exist in the breadth of environmental issues that they address, as
evidenced by the statistical difference (p<0.01) in their entropy score for the breadth of
environmental issues: 1.80 and 2.17 respectively. Variations also exist in the
complementary measure of the breadth of environmental issues (49.32 and 59.62
respectively; p<0.01), which accounts for the quantity of local governments’
sustainability programs in addition to the breadth of environmental issues.
Even though these two groups of local governments implement a similar number of
sustainability programs, I find that they tend to focus on different environmental issues.
More specifically, the local governments with the low- entropy score group have more
sustainability programs that address the environmental issues that are associated with
6 List of the selected 70 local governments that were included in this study could be provided based upon
requests.
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high economic benefits (p<0.01), such as recycling, energy use in the government, and
energy use in outdoor light/vehicles compared to those with the high- entropy score.
By contrast, the local governments with the high- entropy score have more programs
that accrue medium and low level of economic benefits to local governments (p<0.01),
such as air quality, water quality, alternative energy source development compared to
those with the low- entropy score.
Focusing on the breadth of policy instruments, table 2.4 presents the average number
of sustainability programs across 12 policy instrument types between the low-and high-
entropy groups for the breadth of policy instruments (EP), which represent the
exploitative and exploratory sustainability strategy respectively.
Similarly, I conduct a t-test for the total number of sustainability programs across
low-and high- risk sustainability strategy groups and find that they are statistically
similar, 27.23 and 27.51 respectively. However, variations exist (p<0.01) in the breadth
of policy instruments in their entropy score for the breadth of policy instruments: 1.34
and 1.73 respectively. Variations also emerge in the complementary measure of the
breadth of policy instruments (p<0.01), which is the number of sustainability programs
multiplied by the entropy score for breadth of policy instruments (39.60 and 47.82
respectively).
Despite having a similar number of sustainability programs, these local governments
show different patterns in designing their sustainability programs across policy
instrument types. More specifically, the local governments with the low- entropy scores
are likely to have more sustainability programs that use the first generation of
34
environmental policy instruments (p<0.01), such as limits, provision of services and
infrastructure upgrade as compared to those with the high- entropy scores.
By contrast, the local governments with the high- entropy scores have more
sustainability programs that use the second and third generation of environmental policy
instruments (p<0.01 – p<0.10), such as voluntary agreement, education, and green
procurement as compared to those with the low- entropy scores.
Table 2.3
T-test results on average number of sustainability programs across environmental issues
between Low-and High-entropy local governments
Environmental Issues Low-entropy
group (obs=35)
High-entropy
group (obs=35)
P-
value
Low level of
economic
benefits
Total (n=31) 6.56 (0.49) 8.21 (0.30) 0.00
Air quality(n=8) 1.19 (1.53) 1.53 (0.95) 0.28
Water saving and quality(n=6) 1.78 (1.58) 2.19 (1.06) 0.23
Alternative energy (n=9) 0.28 (0.58) 0.66 (0.83) 0.04
Social Inclusion (n=8) 2.75 (2.29) 2.53 (1.14) 0.62
Medium level
of economic
benefits
Total (n=63) 7.00 (0.41) 8.65 (0.38) 0.00
Energy use in Residents(n=13) 0.47 (0.67) 1.09 (1.17) 0.01
Energy use in Business(n=12) 0.09 (0.53) 0.22 (0.66) 0.40
Public transportation
improvements(n=5)
0.47 (0.72) 1.25 (0.84) 0.00
Reduced commute trips (n=6) 0.75 (0.98) 0.63 (0.79) 0.57
Alternative modes of transportation
(n=7)
3.00 (1.61) 3.16 (1.22) 0.66
Green building and construction
(n=7)
0.63 (0.91) 1.19 (1.12) 0.03
Density and Sustainable
development(n=13)
2.16 (1.90) 2.44 (1.34) 0.49
High level of
economic
benefits
Total (n=25) 12.01 (0.45) 10.06 (0.25) 0.00
Energy use in Governments(n=6) 3.75 (1.44) 3.09 (1.06) 0.04
Energy use in Outdoor
light/vehicles(n=9)
2.41 (1.46) 2.53 (1.07) 0.69
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Recycling(n=10) 5.69 (1.62) 4.56 (1.46) 0.00
# of sustainability programs (n=119) 27.34 (1.10) 27.53 (1.05) 0.48
Breadth of environmental issues (EE) 1.80 (0.08) 2.17 (0.06) 0.00
Number * EE 49.32 (2.86) 59.62 (2.92) 0.00
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.4
T-test results on average number of sustainability programs across policy instrument
types between Low-and High-entropy local governments
Policy Instrument Types Low-entropy
group (obs=35)
High-entropy
group(obs=35)
P-
value
3rd generation
of
environmental
policy
instruments
Total (n=19) 2.37 (0.28) 5.37 (0.28) 0.00
Voluntary agreement (n=8) 0.31 (0.76) 1.40 (1.46) 0.00
Education (n=2) 0.40 (0.55) 1.09 (0.61) 0.00
Green procurement (n=9) 1.66 (1.45) 2.89 (1.18) 0.00
2nd generation
of
environmental
policy
instruments
Total (n=49) 3.60 (0.49) 4.71 (0.32) 0.06
Tax benefits (n=11) 0.20 (1.02) 0.17 (0.45) 0.88
Direct payment (n=21) 1.34 (2.24) 0.80 (1.41) 0.22
Reducing fees (n=4) 0.40 (0.85) 0.71 (1.02) 0.16
Other incentive(n=10) 1.40 (1.03) 2.11 (1.18) 0.00
Charges (n=3) 0.26 (0.51) 0.91 (0.56) 0.00
1st generation
of
environmental
policy
instruments
Total (n=43) 20.54 (0.44) 16.97 (0.30) 0.00
Limit (n=9) 2.26 (1.54) 3.06 (1.19) 0.02
Provision of  service(n=18) 10.03 (2.04) 6.94 (1.55) 0.00
Infrastructure Upgrade (n=10) 6.37 (1.31) 5.37 (1.70) 0.01
Infrastructure Establish (n=6) 1.89 (1.05) 1.60 (1.06) 0.26
Number of sustainability programs (n=111) 27.23 (1.14) 27.51 (1.20) 0.31
Breadth of policy instrument (EP) 1.34 (0.08) 1.74 (0.07) 0.00
Number * EP 36.60 (2.50) 47.82 (2.77) 0.00
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Discussion
Taken as a whole, the results indicate that even when local governments adopt a
similar number of sustainability programs, they design their programs differently
according to their sustainability strategies. In terms of the breadth of environmental
issues, local governments that design their programs more narrowly are more likely to
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focus on the issues with high level of economic benefits (e.g., recycling and internal
energy saving). These programs require less effort because of their internal focus and
quicker payoffs (Krause, 20111; Collins, Roper, and Lawrence, 2010; Yanarella and
Levine, 2008), which emphasizes their exploitative strategy. However, local governments
that design their sustainability programs more broadly are more likely to focus on the
more complex environmental issues even though they are associated with low level of
economic benefits (e.g., air, water, alternative energy, and social inclusion). Despite the
less certain economic benefits, these air, water, alternative energy and social inclusion
issues have been considered key elements for creating a vibrant community (Bulkeley
and Betsill, 2005). While addressing these environmental issues usually leads to greater
environmental improvements, such actions might incur high costs and uncertainty for
local governments as they need to target broad community members (Daley et al., 2013),
conduct large-scale investments (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005), and make fundamental
changes in their community as well as internal organizations. However, their broader
focus on a variety of environmental issues may have more extensive and innovative
impacts on a community’s health and environmental quality, implying their exploratory
sustainability strategy. Therefore, these findings provide evidence in support of
Proposition 1, which states that local governments that design sustainability strategies
around a narrower breadth of environmental issues emphasize environmental impacts
with more certain economic benefits than local governments that design sustainability
strategies around a broader breadth of environmental issues.
Related to the breadth of policy instruments, local governments that design their
programs more narrowly are more likely to depend on the first generation of policy
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instruments (e.g., provision of public services and infrastructure upgrades). These policy
instruments are relatively more feasible options for local governments as they could
easily implement them by modifying existing public services or infrastructures.
Moreover, providing favorable services may ensure the delivery of short-term policy
outcomes (Yanarella and Levine, 2008) because it encourages immediate behavior
changes by individuals and organizations, but less likely to sustain in the absence of the
favorable assistances, implying their exploitative sustainability strategy.
By contrast, local governments that design their sustainability programs more broadly
are more likely to use a variety of policy instruments including the second and the third
generation of policy instruments (e.g., voluntary agreements, education, and economic-
incentives). These policy instruments have great potential to sustain pro-environmental
behaviors by individuals and organizations because they address critical barriers that
inhibit their behavior changes, such as a lack of money, knowledge, and social norms
(Braun, 2007; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). More specifically, voluntary agreements
and educational offerings are likely to induce fundamental changes in individuals’ and
organizations’ behaviors by increasing awareness of an overriding goal to achieve,
distributing information and knowledge about environmental issues, and ultimately
shifting a cultural or social norm within the community—all of which may contribute to
widespread community engagement in the local environmental governance (Selman and
Parker, 1997). Due to this policy potential, voluntary agreements and educational
opportunities have increasingly gained popularity among practitioners as a new policy
instrument of environmental policy (Dietz and Stern, 2002; Kemp, 2000). Similarly, the
economic instruments could establish effective incentive systems for community
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engagements in pro-environmental behaviors as they are designed to be sensitive to the
needs of target groups (Braun, 2007). Despite the extensive impacts of these policy
instruments on individuals and organizations, these policy instruments may incur higher
costs and uncertainty for local governments to implement these policy instruments
because they are more likely to require strong political commitments, widespread
community engagement and modified institutional settings (e.g. tax systems) to ensure
the behavior changes in a long-term basis (Braun, 2007; Wheeler, 2007). All of these
factors imply their exploratory sustainability strategy. Taken as a group, these findings
offer evidence to support Proposition 2, which states that local governments that design
sustainability strategies around a narrower breadth of policy instruments emphasize
environmental impacts with more traditional policy instruments than local governments
that design sustainability strategies around a broader breadth of environmental issues.
Conclusion
Local governments worldwide have increasingly engaged in envisioning, designing,
and implementing sustainability programs (Bae and Feiock, 2013; Berry and Porteny,
2013; Daley et al., 2013; Porteny, 2003; Sharp et al., 2011). However, the environmental
performance of these sustainability programs hinges on their program design (Darnall
and Kim, 2012).
My study offers several important contributions to research on sustainability
management at the local level. First, while previous literature has suggested that adopting
more sustainability programs may lead to stronger environmental outcomes (Berry and
Portney, 2013; de la Cruz, 2009; Owen and Videras, 2008; Portney, 2003; Swann, 2015),
I offer strong evidence that these programs are not designed equivalently. Local
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governments that pursue an exploratory strategy when designing their sustainability
programs address a broad array of environmental issues and use a broad spectrum of
policy instruments to address them. With their broader focus, they tend to address more
complex environmental issues associated with air, water, and social inclusion, all of
which are more likely affect both community health and environmental quality that other
type of environmental issues. They also tend to use a diverse set of policy instruments to
encourage individuals’ and organizations’ behavior changes directly and indirectly. In
contrast, local governments that pursue an exploitative strategy focus on a limited
number of environmental issues (e.g., recycling and internal government energy use) and
use a more restricted set of policy instrument types (e.g., provision of services and
infrastructure upgrades) to ensure reliability of their programs benefits in short-term.
These design differences exist even if the number of sustainability programs across both
types of local governments is equivalent. Given the importance of program design and its
link with improved sustainability performance (Darnall and Kim, 2012), findings have
important implications for distinguishing among local governments’ sustainability
programs. That is, sustainability programs borne from a exploratory strategy may be
more likely to produce more desirable policy outcomes in long-run. These differences
might otherwise go unnoticed if I focused exclusively on the number of programs that
they implement (Schaffrin, Sewerin, and Seubert, 2015).
My findings therefore suggest that local governments should take a more strategic and
integrative approach when designing their sustainability programs (Yanarella and Levein,
2008). Without careful consideration of program design, local governments’
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sustainability efforts may lack value and, at some point, lose critical stakeholder support
or futility (Fiorino, 2010).
Finally, since my findings offer evidence of distinctions between design features in
local sustainability programs, additional research would benefit from a more in depth
analysis of why these features vary. While prior research suggests that variations are
likely due to differences in stakeholder (Engel and Orbach, 2008) and competitive
pressures (Hart and Millstein, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2010), these issues have not been
investigated empirically as they relate to the local governments’ sustainability strategies,
and especially the design features of their sustainability programs. Additionally, future
research should explore how variations in local governments’ sustainability strategies are
related empirically with environmental outcomes over time. My research suggests that
local governments that adopt sustainability programs that address a greater breadth of
environmental issues and utilize a broader number of policy instruments to address them
are more likely to improve environmental outcomes to a greater extent. However, these
relationships have not yet been explored systematically. My hope is that this research
offers a justification for doing so. Finally, my study characterizes sustainability strategies
based on two design features (the breadth of environmental issues and the breadth of
policy instruments). However, there might be other salient design features to consider,
such as the stringency of environmental standards and monitoring/enforcement
mechanisms. Examining these sorts of design features would offer a richer explanation
about variations in local governments’ sustainability programs. My hope is that my
comparative analysis serves as a basis for undertaking future research in this area as there
is still much to learn about how the design of local governments’ sustainability strategies .
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Chapter 3
WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PURSUE DIFFERENT TYPES OF
SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES?
Political resistance, high regulatory costs, and technical limitations have constrained
national governments from enacting stringent regulations in response to global
environmental problems (Potoski, 2015). In absence of national action, and in the face of
increasing environmental risk, local governments worldwide have voluntarily
implemented their own sustainability strategies to improve community health and
environmental quality (Hawkins et al., 2016). These strategies are usually composed of a
set of programs that utilize incentive-oriented tools to encourage individuals and firms to
behave in more sustainable ways (Borck & Coglianese, 2009). They tend to target a
variety of areas—from recycling to utility usage and land development—(Feiock &
Coutts, 2013) and have the potential to create distinctive public benefits including
improved environmental outcomes, quality of life, and community well-being (Daley et
al., 2013; Florida, 2005).
Despite their promise, local government’s sustainability strategies do not yield the
same environmental performance outcomes because of variations in how they are
designed. For instance, as part of their sustainability strategy, some local governments
choose to design their programs across a broad array of environmental issues (Daley et
al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2010) to create innovative pathways to sustainability (Ayre &
Callway, 2005), thereby differentiating themselves (Segev, 1989) from other
governments. In other cases, local governments focus on only certain types of
environmental issues that are likely to generate short-term, tangible benefits to
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governments (Kosloff, Trexler, & Nelson, 2004), thereby appealing to external
stakeholder pressures for environmental protection (K. Engel, 2006). As such, local
governments may assess their internal motivations and external pressures to make
strategic decisions in designing their sustainability programs, which forms its
sustainability strategy (Sharma, 2000). Local governments’ pursuit of different
sustainability strategies may subsequently affect how effective they are at improving the
local environmental quality and enhancing the quality of life of community residents.
However, as yet, scholars have known little about the different types of sustainability
strategies that local governments pursue, and the factors that influence local governments
to adopt one sustainability strategy over another.
Prior literature assessing the factors that influence local governments’ sustainability
decisions has typically regarded their decisions monolithically (Bae & Feiock, 2013)–
either local governments adopt a program or not (Sharp et al., 2010) or how many
programs to implement (Hawkins et al., 2016; Krause, 2011; Portney, 2003; Swann,
2016). In this paper, I suggest that differing stakeholder interests and organizational
capacity are likely to influence local public managers to pursue certain types of
sustainability strategies and therefore their strategic decisions about whether or not a
local government chooses to address a narrow or a broad range of environmental issues.
However, as yet, previous literature has not considered how different these factors are
related to local government’s pursuit of different types of sustainability strategies that
lead to variations in their sustainability designs.
In this paper, I explore how variations in stakeholders’ pressures and internal
organizational capacities relate with different types of local governments’ sustainability
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strategies. Drawing on previous literature on organizations’ voluntary environmental
strategy (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Porter
& Kramer, 2006; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), I characterizes local governments’
sustainability strategies (reactive, middle group, and proactive) based on a design aspect
of their sustainability programs, in particular the breadth of environmental issues that
they address in sustainability programs. I empirically assess this framework using data
from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)’s Local
Sustainability Program Survey, the U.S. Census, and the National Charitable Center
Statistics (NCCS) to analyze the sustainability strategies of 1,146 US local governments.
Findings indicate that external pressures from heavy industry stakeholders and weaker
organizational capacities are associated with local governments that pursue a reactive
sustainability strategy (designing sustainability programs across a narrow array of
environmental issues). By contrast, external pressures from new economy stakeholders
and stronger organizational capacities are associated with local governments that pursue a
proactive sustainability strategy (designing sustainability programs across a broad array
of environmental issues).
These findings extend existing local government literature by developing a more
comprehensive framework of local governments’ sustainability strategies. By virtue of
their more comprehensive design, a proactive strategy may be more likely to lead to more
improved environmental outcomes. If so, knowledge of these relationships provides local
government managers and policymakers with important information about the factors
needed to achieve the full potential of their sustainability strategies.
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A TYPOLOGY OF LOCAL SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES
Local public managers chose among a variety of strategies when implementing their
sustainability programs, with the goal of improving environmental conditions within their
community (Daley et al., 2013). Previous literature examining the implementation of
local governments’ sustainability programs has mainly focused on their number only
(Berry & Portney, 2013; Portney, 2003; Swann, 2016). They usually considered local
governments that implement more sustainability programs as being more serious about
sustainability issues (Portney, 2003) and more likely to improve the environmental
conditions within their community than local governments that implement only a few or a
modest number of programs (Portney, 2003; Svara, 2011).
However, even for local governments that implement a similar number of
sustainability programs, variations are likely to exist in the breadth of environmental
issues that they address (Sharp et al., 2010). In other words, some local governments may
address a broad array of environmental issues across, say, 10 sustainability programs
whereas others address only a few environmental issues across the same number of
programs. The local governments that address a broad array of environmental issues tend
to more holistically integrate all their related environmental issues into their sustainability
programs, and establish multiple pathways to address them (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003).
Such an holistic approach requires local governments to coordinate their programs not
only across multiple departments within a government (Krause, Feiock, & Hawkins,
2016; Zeemering, 2009), but also across community members, the private and non-profit
sectors (Sharp et al., 2010), which is more time intensive and costly than taking a less
holistic approach. However, by addressing a greater breadth of environmental issues,
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local governments can achieve greater (and more long-term) environmental
improvements while also enhancing social wellbeing and economic growth (Florida,
2005).
Despite the importance of the design aspect of sustainability programs in examining
local governments’ sustainability strategy, yet researchers have very little understanding
about how local governments’ sustainability programs vary by the breadth of
environmental concerns they address. Considering the design dimension extends the prior
research on local governments’ sustainability efforts and further offers a more
comprehensive understanding about how local governments implement their
sustainability programs and the potential they may have to improve environmental
conditions within their community. I suggest that local governments’ pursuit of different
sustainability strategies is closely related to the breadth of environmental issues that these
programs address. Drawing from prior literature examining organizations’ strategic
postures toward implementing voluntary environmental programs (Aragón-Correa, 1998;
Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), I
suggest local governments may pursue three types of sustainability strategies: reactive,
middle group, and proactive strategies.
Local governments that pursue a reactive strategy design their sustainability
programs across a narrow array of environmental issues (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Porter &
Kramer, 2006; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Local governments that pursue this strategy
do not perceive environmental protection as an essential part of their organizational
mission (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) because they often lack understanding and
concern about environmental problems (Basu & Palazzo, 2008). Instead of implementing
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sustainability programs for substantial environmental performance outcomes, they tend to
promote the sustainability programs that are practically feasible and often appeal to their
stakeholders (Yanarella & Levine, 2008), while seeking for short-term environmental
benefits (Daley et al., 2013; Yanarella & Levine, 2008). For instance, some local
governments implement sustainability programs with emphasis on resource efficiency
issues within their organization in an effort to reduce their internal costs (Bae & Feiock,
2013; Daley et al., 2013) rather than improving the environmental conditions in the
broader community (Hawkins et al., 2016).Given a lack of a consistent sustainability
strategy }(Porter & Kramer, 2006; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), they are more likely to
constrain their programs into recycling or energy saving issues in government buildings
for which the short-term benefits are ensured (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013;
Yanarella & Levine, 2008). By doing so, they could appeal to external pressures for
environmental protection(Yanarella & Levine, 2008), while enjoying economic benefits
that accrue to their organizations (Daley et al., 2013). The implementation of
sustainability programs is therefore typically based on an ad hoc approach (Miles, Snow,
Meyer, & Coleman, 1978) that address issues as they arise instead of approaching in a
more calculated manner (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998).
By contrast, a proactive strategy involves local governments that design their
sustainability programs across a broad array of environmental issues. Local governments
pursuing a proactive strategy are likely to be leading actors in the local sustainability
movement (Ayre & Callway, 2005) and therefore focus on differentiating themselves
(Miles et al., 1978) from other governments. To be a leading actor, these governments
focus on more complex and fundamental environmental issues even if doing so comes
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with higher costs and efforts (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Moreover, proactive local
governments tend to pursue long-term social and environmental benefits (as opposed to
short-term wins) that may create competitive advantages to the external community as
well as internal long-term efficiency goals (Slater & Mohr, 2006), such as improvements
to human health and well-being, social vitality, and resource efficiency (Fiorino, 2010).
Such efforts require a sustainability vision and the creation of innovative changes that are
often followed by others (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Sharma &
Vredenburg, 1998).
Finally, local governments that pursue a middle group strategy implement
sustainability programs in an effort to avoid being laggards (March, 1991) in local
sustainability movement. Their primary interest is to maintain stability (March, 1991) and
therefore tend to promote certain level of environmental performance outcomes from
their sustainability programs, which makes them seemingly proactive. However, they are
less likely to take high risk associated with creating fundamental and innovative changes
(Kim & Darnall, 2015; Miles et al., 1978), and therefore their sustainability programs
tend to be less comprehensive than those pursuing a proactive strategy. For instance,
some local governments tend to balance between potential benefits and costs (Miles et
al., 1978) associated with implementing sustainability programs and therefore
analytically design their sustainability programs by distributing them across different
environmental issues (Aragón-Correa, 1998), but still focusing on certain types of
environmental issues that ensure tangible and immediate program benefits (Porter &
Kramer, 2006). They also gradually tailor their sustainability programs to changing
circumstances (Miles et al., 1978) in a way to reduce uncertainty related to sustainability
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program benefits, while achieving incremental, modest changes (Slater & Mohr, 2006).
For their interest in reliability of program performance outcomes from implementing
sustainability programs, their sustainability efforts could be in between those pursuing a
proactive strategy and those pursuing a reactive strategy.
Taken together, local governments implement a variety of sustainability strategies. I
posit that their pursuit of one strategy over another is due to differences in stakeholder
pressures on one hand (English, 2000 (English, 2000; Krause, 2011) and organizational
capacities on the other (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Hood, 2007; Howlett, 2011; Steurer, 2011).
Stakeholder pressures and local sustainability
Stakeholders are defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 2010), p.46). They are the
individuals who experience or anticipate experiencing actual or potential harms/benefits
that result from an organization’s action or inaction (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).
Related to an organization’s sustainability efforts, stakeholders with diverse and often
conflicting interests are principal participants in sustainability programs (Daley et al.,
2013; English, 2000). These interests create incentives for stakeholders to exert their
political influence (K. H. Engel & Orbach, 2008) on local governments to behave in
favor of their interests. Stakeholders with different interests and motivations (Daley et al.,
2013; Hawkins et al., 2016) are therefore likely to be related to local governments’
pursuit of one sustainability strategy over another. I suggest that industry stakeholders
and environmental NGOs are two stakeholder groups that are particularly salient to local
governments’ sustainability strategies (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Vogel & Swanson,
1989).
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Industry stakeholders are private sector firms that must adhere to current
environmental regulations, and tend to emphasize economic growth as their most salient
interest (Logan & Molotch, 2007). Industry stakeholders are also major sources of tax
revenue, and are drivers of local economic growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Portney,
2003)and therefore exert significant influences on local governments’ environmental
decisions (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley & Garand, 2005; Portney, 2003).
Even though local governments’ sustainability strategies do not impose the same
economic burden on industry stakeholders as traditional environmental regulation (Borck
& Coglianese, 2009), these approaches can constrain some firms’ profits by increasing
the cost of raw materials (Daley & Garand, 2005). In particular, heavy polluting industry
stakeholders (Mani & Wheeler, 1998) often oppose local government’s efforts to increase
environmental protection. These stakeholders tend to generate environmental impacts
across a variety of areas, from consuming significant quantities of raw materials (e.g.
coal, lumber, water) to producing industrial waste (Daley & Garand, 2005). Industry
stakeholders are therefore more likely to express concern about local governments’
sustainability strategies that address a broad array of environmental issues (Fiorino,
1999). For example, industry stakeholders are often large landholders (Brody, 2003), and
since much of the U.S.’ critical habitats are located on or near private lands (Yaffee &
Wondolleck, 2000), industry stakeholders and especially those in polluting industries are
likely to affect environmental issues related to biodiversity, preservation of habitats, or
management of natural resources (Brody, 2003; O'Connell & Noss, 1992). Moreover,
heavy polluting industry stakeholders are less likely to be supportive of sustainability
programs that promote citizen awareness and influence social norms in favor of
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environmental protection, as both may increase external scrutiny about the legitimacy of
their business operations (Luft Mobus, 2005).
Other industry stakeholders, and especially new economy industry stakeholders, are
more likely to support environmental protection (Daley et al., 2013; Florida, 2005). New
economy industry stakeholders consist of emerging science and technology businesses
and particularly those associated with information and communications technologies
(Hirsch, 2001; Krueger & Gibbs, 2007). The interests of new economy industry
stakeholders differ from the heavy polluting industry stakeholders because the former
generates relatively little pollution, and depends on recruiting and retaining workers who
are creative, well-educated and mobile (Florida, 2005; Krueger & Gibbs, 2007). Such
workers tend to seek communities that offer a better quality of life, including a cleaner
environment (Krueger & Gibbs, 2007), and an urban setting that is more environmentally
friendly (Florida, 2005). New economy industry stakeholders therefore tend to pressure
their local governments to implement a large number of sustainability programs that
improve the environmental quality of a broad scope of environmental concerns (Florida,
2005; Krueger & Gibbs, 2007).
In contrast to industry stakeholders, environmental NGO stakeholders are organized
forms of civil society that operate without profit-seeking objectives and fill the public
space between individual citizens and the state (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Lane &
Morrison, 2006). They are generally supportive of local governments’ efforts to
implement sustainability programs (Daley et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2010) (Zeemering,
2009). Environmental NGOs assist local governments in responding to environmental
issues, and educate citizens about the environmental risks in their communities (Lane &
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Morrison, 2006). These entities often hold local governments responsible for creating
broader public benefits (Young, 2000) associated with a cleaner environment (Daley et
al., 2013)and monitor the effectiveness of government policies (Gan, Eskeland, &
Kolshus, 2007). As a consequence, they are more likely to encourage local governments
to adopt a large number of sustainability programs that address a wide array of
environmental issues. Additionally, environmental NGOs work closely with individual
citizens and seek mobilize the broader public in favor of environmental protection
(Buffardi, Pekkanen, & Smith, 2015).
Internal organizational capacity and local sustainability
While stakeholder pressures are likely to relate to local governments’ sustainability
strategies, so too are internal factors. Organizations are often internally motivated and
driven by their own interests (Porter & Kramer, 2006), such as reputational benefits
(Posner & Weisbach, 2010), internal operational efficiency (Daley et al., 2013), and
community well-being (Fiorino, 2010). Their ability to pursue these interests often
depends on organization-specific capacities (Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994; Barney &
Hansen, 1994). Two types of capacities that are particularly salient to local governments’
decisions to implement one sustainability strategy over another: general administrative
capacity and policy-specific capacity (Howlett, 2009a; Terman & Feiock, 2015).
Administrative capacity relates to the financing and staffing of an organization’s
administration (Collins & Gerber, 2008; Howlett, 2009a; Wang, Hawkins, Lebredo, &
Berman, 2012). Since local governments’ sustainability strategies are not financed by
federal and state governments, managing organizational resources is essential for them to
undertake these voluntary efforts (Wang et al., 2012). Local governments that possess the
greater administrative capacity are more capable of allocating organizational resources
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and facilitating managerial decisions towards implementing(Collins & Gerber, 2008) a
more comprehensive sustainability strategy. For instance, implementing a greater number
of sustainability programs often comes with a greater financial investment (Wang et al.,
2012) and administrative cost (Krause et al., 2016), thereby requiring greater
administrative capacity (Wang et al., 2012). Local governments with greater
administrative capacities therefore are more capable of implementing a large set of
sustainability programs (Feiock & Coutts, 2013)and achieving the organizational vision
of sustainability.
By contrast, policy-specific capacity is related to government’s ability to address
substantive policy responsibilities, and requires access to expertise and information and
professional staff (Howlett, 2009b). Greater information, knowledge, and technical
assistance (Howlett, 2009b) allow local government to address contemporary
environmental issues, which have become increasingly more complex (Potoski, 2015) as
populations increase and technologies expand. For instance, policy-specific capacity
allows local governments to invest in developing databases related to environmental
issues within their community, identifying the most effective combination of policy
instruments for their given circumstances (Sovacool, 2009), and developing integrative
sustainability programs (Bulkeley, 2010; Daley et al., 2013). Local governments that
have access to policy-specific capacity are therefore more likely to design a sustainability
strategy that emphasizes a large number of substantive programs addressing a broad array
of environmental issues.
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External stakeholder pressures, internal organizational capacity, and local
sustainability strategies
Taken together, in considering the extent to which the external stakeholders and
internal organizational capacities influence local governments’ sustainability efforts, I use
a middle group strategy as a point of comparison.
Compared to local governments that pursue a middle group strategy, local
governments that pursue a reactive strategy – by designing their programs across a
narrow array of environmental issues – are related to greater external pressures from
heavy polluting industry stakeholders who typically oppose the environmental protection,
and weaker organizational capacity. Heavy polluting industry stakeholders are under
significant pressure from state and federal regulators and community residents to reduce
their environmental impacts. However, doing so can come at a significant cost, which is
why they exert pressures by way of political activities that include lobbying and political
campaigns during policy making process (Singleton, 2000). In order to overcome the
political resistance from the heavy polluting industry stakeholders(Yanarella & Levine,
2008), and to address social preferences for improved environmental quality, local
governments are more likely to constrain their sustainability programs into a few
environmental issues, and especially those that involve fewer costs to industrial activities.
By doing so, local governments can achieve some environmental objectives without
political resistance from heavy polluting industry stakeholders (Yanarella & Levine,
2008). Even if heavy polluting industry stakeholders do not engage in active political
protest, by virtue of their greater physical presence within their community, heavy
polluting industry stakeholders may pressure local governments to focus on specific
environmental issues that impose fewer costs them, rather pressuring local governments
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to adopt sustainability strategies that lead to fundamental changes in environmental
quality.
Related to internal organizational capacities, local governments that lack
administrative capacities are more likely to have constrained budgets and staffs for
undertaking large investment for initiating sustainability programs that are not their
traditional public services (Wang et al., 2012). These organizations often emphasize
organizational efficiency rather than broader interests in community in implementing
sustainability programs (Daley et al., 2013; Yanarella & Levine, 2008). Moreover, with
lack of policy specific capacities, local governments are less likely to have greater
information and understanding about complex environmental issues, thereby resorting to
the sustainability programs that are constrained to a narrow array of environmental issues
and focus on serving to organizational benefits, such as energy savings in government
(Daley et al., 2013; Yanarella & Levine, 2008). Therefore, under greater pressures from
heavy polluting industry stakeholders coupled with lack of organizational capacity, local
governments are more likely to pursue a reactive sustainability strategy by constraining
their programs into a few environmental issues.
Hypothesis 1) Compared to local governments that pursue a middle group strategy,
local governments with greater pressures from heavy polluting industry stakeholders
and weaker organizational capacities are more likely to pursue a reactive sustainability
strategy.
By contrast, compared to those pursuing a middle group strategy, local governments
that pursue a proactive strategy have greater pressures from stakeholders who support
their environmental efforts and greater organizational capacity. Pursuing a proactive
strategy often requires greater organizational commitment (Sharma, 2000) due to greater
political conflicts, administrative cost, and uncertain benefits associated with
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implementing a large set of programs that are broad in scope. New economy industry and
environmental NGOs promote a better quality of life in their community and therefore
motivate local governments to undertake a more serious sustainability strategy by
providing financial and technical assistance (Florida, 2005), increasing public awareness
of environmental protection (Lane & Morrison, 2006), and engaging in political
campaigns or lobbying (Daley et al., 2013). The presence of strong pressures from the
supportive stakeholders legitimates local governments’ fiscal and administrative
investment for their sustainability programs (Wang et al., 2012) and further preempts
political resistances from other stakeholders who oppose the environmental protection
effort (Kim & Darnall, 2015).
In addition to the external pressures, greater policy-specific capacity enables local
governments to develop, manage, and coordinate their complex issues in a way that spans
multiple environmental issues (Hawkins et al., 2016), while greater administrative
capacity allows local governments to finance and staff the well designed sustainability
programs (Hawkins et al., 2016). More specifically, because of their policy-specific
capacities, these governments have greater information, knowledge and understanding
about complicated environmental issues (Howlett, 2009b), and therefore have the
capacity to address a broader array of environmental issues than reactive local
governments. Therefore, local governments that have greater pressures from new
economy and environmental NGO stakeholders, in addition to stronger internal
organizational capacities, are more likely to pursue a proactive sustainability strategy by
designing their programs in a more comprehensive manner.
Hypothesis 2) Compared to local governments that pursue a middle group strategy,
local governments with greater stakeholder pressures from new economy
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industry and environmental NGO stakeholders, and organizational
capacities, are more likely to adopt a proactive sustainability strategy.
Methodology
Data
To examine how stakeholders and organizational capacity relates to local
governments’ decisions to pursue different sustainability strategies, I rely on the data
from the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)’s 2010 Local
Government Sustainability Programs Survey. Developed by ICMA’s Center for
Sustainable Communities, with input from other research institutes (Svara, 2011), the
survey questioned sustainability managers within U.S. local governments regarding the
adoption of 119 different sustainability programs.
The survey was mailed to sustainability managers of total 8,569 local governments
including county and municipal governments that had at least 2,500 populations. Local
governments that did not respond to the first survey received a follow-up reminder. A
total 2,176 (25.39%) local governments (1,874 municipalities and 302 counties)
responded (Svara, 2011) to the survey.
These data were combined with data from the U.S. Census and the National Center
for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to form explanatory and control variables (discussed
below). After the data merge, a total of 1,146 local governments remained in the sample.
Among these local governments, I selected 312 local governments to form dependent
variable, which categorizes local governments into four types of sustainability strategies.
The process through which I selected 312 local governments is discussed in the following
section.
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Measures
Dependent variable
To measure the dependent variable, three sustainability strategies were developed:
reactive, middle group, and proactive strategies. To create this categorical variable, I
consider how broad environmental issues were addressed by local governments in their
sustainability programs.
To assess the breadth of environmental issues, I relied on data from ICMA’s survey,
which provided sustainability managers with a list of 119 sustainability programs. For
each of these programs, respondents were asked to indicate which actions their local
government had taken. Respondents reported ‘Yes’ (1) or ‘No’ (0) for each sustainability
program. To measure the breadth of local governments’ environmental issues, the ICMA
survey categorized the 119 sustainability programs into eight aggregate environmental
impacts (air, water, recycling, energy conservation, buildings, land use, transportation,
and social inclusion), which I disaggregated based on their specific goals and target
populations. For example, energy conservation programs were disaggregated based on
their pollution source as sustainability programs that address more pollution sources have
greater breadth (Daley et al., 2013). This step led to the generation of five types of energy
items (energy in government, energy in residential homes, energy in business, energy in
outdoor lights/vehicles, and alternative energy generation) and three types of
transportation (public transportation, reduced commute trips, and alternative modes of
vehicles). After disaggregation, 14 environmental issues were considered: air, water,
recycling, energy in government, energy in residential homes, energy in business, energy
in outdoor lights/vehicles, alternative energy generation, public transportation, reduced
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commute trips, alternative modes of vehicles, green building/construction, sustainable
land use, and social inclusion.
In finalizing the measure for breadth of environmental issues, I utilized Shannon’s H
entropy score (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). Shannon’s H entropy score is one of the most
widely used measures for breadth or diversity of items because it is sensitive to high
levels of scope and therefore leads to wider variation than other types of breadth
measures (e.g. Herphindal HirschmanIndex) (Halpin & Thomas III, 2012).
Shannon’s H entropy score takes the following form:
E = P ∗ ln(1/P )
where Pj is a proportion of sustainability programs addressing jth environmental issue in
total adopted sustainable programs, the logarithm of 1/Pj is a weight of each proportion
and m is the number of total available environmental issues, which is in this case 14.
Local governments whose sustainability programs address a greater breadth of
environmental issues therefore receive a higher the entropy score (EE).
Local governments’ sustainability strategies were characterized based on the breadth
of environmental issues: reactive, middle group, or proactive. Since this dimension is
delimited along a continuum, I focus on local governments that, on average, have greater
variability in their sustainability strategies. In other words, I focus on the extreme groups
of local governments with sustainability programs that are either extremely high or low in
terms of the breadth of environmental issues, as shown in Figure 3.1. A low breadth of
environmental issues was defined as local governments that were in the bottom 25%
(lower than 25 percentile) with respect to their entropy score, whereas a high breadth of
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environmental issues was defined as local governments that were in the top 25% (greater
than 75 percentile) with respect to their entropy score. As a sensitivity check, I also
created low and high groups by categorizing local governments that were one standard
deviation away from the mean. I also varied the percentiles to 20%/80%, rather than
25%/75%. In both instances, the results are consistent, although I lose observations.
Figure 3.1
Three types of sustainability strategies
Local governments pursuing a reactive sustainability strategy were coded as having a
low entropy score. A proactive sustainability strategy was coded as local governments
having a high entropy score. Finally, local governments pursuing a middle group strategy
were coded as local governments of which entropy scores are in the middle range. Table
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3.1 shows the sample size and descriptive statistics for each category of my dependent
variable.
Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics for attributes of local sustainability strategies
Number of sustainability
programs
Breadth of environmental
issues
Frequency
(%) Mean (S.D.) Min Max Mean (S.D.) Min Max
Reactive
(Low-Entropy) 287 (25.04%) 8.63 (4.51) 1 22 1.15 (0.47) 0.00 1.63
Middle group
(Mid-Entropy) 573 (50.00%) 20.96 (7.49) 6 50 1.92 (0.15) 1.64 2.15
Proactive
(High-Entropy) 286 (24.96%) 40.24 (11.90) 10 76 2.27 (0.09) 2.15 2.51
Total 1146 (100.00%) 24.04 (20.76) 0 76 1.67 (0.77) 0.00 2.51
Explanatory Variables
Industry stakeholder pressures were measured by the number of employees since the
employment size of an industrial sector often indicates the capacity of that industry to
influence urban environmental politics (Bowen, 2002). I distinguished polluting industry
stakeholders by using NAICS industry codes and 2007 Economic Census data to
determine the total number of employees in each industry for each locality. Since
manufacturing industries have been commonly employed as proxy for polluting
industries (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013; Portney, 2003), I measured the heavy
polluting industry stakeholder pressures by the total number of employees in the
manufacturing industry within the locality divided by total population of the locality.
Similarly, new economy industry stakeholders were measured by the total number of
employees in information technology (IT) industry divided by total population.
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I measured local environmental NGO stakeholder pressure (Daley et al., 2013) by
relying on data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to determine
the number of environmental NGOs in a locality. Even though the size of each
stakeholder group is not a perfect measure for each group’s actual pressure on local
governments, larger stakeholder groups often come with stronger power and capacity
(Eesley & Lenox, 2006) and therefore are more likely to influence local governments in
favor of their particular concerns.
Since greater fiscal capacity increases local governments’ autonomy to finance their
sustainability programs (Wang et al., 2012), local governments’ general administrative
capacity was measured by the degree to which local governments acquire revenues from
their own sources such as taxes, public service fees and charges rather than
intergovernmental aids (Ji, Ahn, & Chapman, 2015; Wang et al., 2012). These data were
obtained from the US Census Bureau’s 2006 Government Finance data that includes
information about each local government’s revenues and expenditures from different
sources. I calculated fiscal independence by subtracting intergovernmental revenues from
general revenues and then dividing the remaining revenue by general revenues of a
locality.
General administrative capacity was also accounted by whether local government had
professional leadership delivered by an appointed executive (Svara, 2011).7 An appointed
executive is put into place by local council members and is relatively insulated from
7 Local governments have different types of leaders according to their government forms, either the
appointed executive (e.g. the commission-administrator form for counties or the council-manager form for
cities) or the elected executive (e.g. the commission-elected executive form for counties or the mayor-
council form for cities) (Feiock, 2004; Nelson & Svara, 2011; Svara, 2010).
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urban politics (Nelson & Svara, 2012; Sharp et al., 2010). As such, this individual
possesses greater capacity to execute administrative tasks, from financing to staffing,
compared to the elected executive who plays more political leadership. To measure
professional leadership in local governments, I relied on an ICMA survey item that asked
about whether the local government had a council-manager form for municipalities and
council administrator form for counties (coded 1, otherwise 0).
Local governments’ policy-specific capacities, was first measured by their
membership with external networks (Bulkeley, 2010) since such membership often
provides local governments with information, technical and financial assistance for their
sustainability efforts (Bulkeley, 2010). I drew on survey data obtained from ICMA that
asked whether local governments were members of the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (coded 1, otherwise 0), one of the most influential networks
that assist local governments’ sustainability initiatives, especially with responding to
climate change (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Bulkeley, 2010).
A second measure of local governments’ policy-specific capacities related their
number of public employees focused on environmental concerns. Compared to other
public employees, these individuals have greater access to local knowledge and
information about environmental issues and therefore have greater expertise in handling
environmental problems (Daily & Huang, 2001). They often identify environmental
issues within their locality (Baker, Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 2012; Sarkis,
Gonzalez-Torre, & Adenso-Diaz, 2010) and have responsibility for resolving them. Data
from the 2006 US Census Bureau Local Government Employment and Payroll were used
to determine the number of local government employees working in areas of natural
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resources, park and recreations, public welfare, health, solid waste management, and
public utilities (cities only). This number was divided by the total population in the
locality.
Control Variables
Local governments’ choice of sustainability strategies is not accounted for solely by
external political influences and internal organizational capacities. Since income and race
are often associated with a community’s interest in environmental concerns (Edwards &
Darnall, 2010), I account for each locality’s income and proportion of Caucasian
residents using the 2007 American Community Survey from U.S. Census Bureau.
Political orientation of the state in which the local government is located can
significantly influence local governments and their environmental priorities (Saha &
Paterson, 2008) in that Democrats typically support a pro-environmental political agenda.
As such, I rely on data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission to determine the
average percentage of the popular vote for the Democratic party candidates in the 2004
and 2008 elections. Local governments that are located in the state for which average
percentages in these both elections are greater than 50% were coded 1, otherwise 0.
Local governments located in different regions may face different geographical
patterns and environmental problems (Svara, 2011; Zahran, Grover, Brody, & Vedlitz,
2008). To control for regional characteristics, using ICMA data, I include a set of dummy
variables accounting for Western, North Central, North East, and Southern regions. Each
dummy variable was coded 1 for each region, and 0 otherwise. The North East region is
the reference group dummy.
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Municipal governments differ from county governments in the types of public
services they provide, revenue and expenditure structures, and the relationship with state
governments (Ji et al., 2015), which may influence their sustainability programs. Using
data from the ICMA survey, I control for the type of local government, municipal
governments coded 1, county government coded 0.
Finally, the size of the locality may influence local governments’ sustainability
strategies because larger localities have more complicated environmental problems and
often are more capable or resourceful when implementing their sustainability programs
(Bae & Feiock, 2013). Uing data from the US Census American Community Survey, this
variable was measured by the locality’s population divided by its geographical size (Bae
& Feiock, 2013).
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in
my analysis.
Empirical Model
To empirically examine my research hypotheses, I relied on multinomial logistic
regression analysis. This technique is especially suitable for the purposes given my four
category dependent variable. Multinomial logistic regression examines jointly all
categories of the explanatory variable, and uses one of the categories as reference to
allow for comparisons among responses observed in the dependent variable. A middle
group strategy was a reference category. I report coefficients for each of the variables
and marginal effects of variables that appear statistically significant for easier
interpretability of my results. To examine the robustness of my empirical results, I also
conducted Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions for the breadth of environmental
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issues and number of sustainability programs. However, a primary interest of this paper is
why some local governments choose to design their sustainability programs more or less
broadly than others. Compared to the linear relationships from the OLS regression
results, analyzing local governments’ sustainability efforts by groups may provide more
insightful information to differentiating local sustainability leaders or laggards from those
doing moderately. For this reason, I placed greater emphasis on multinomial logit
regression results.
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15)
1)  Heavy polluting industries 1.00
2)  New economy industries -0.11 1.00
3) Num of NGOs -0.18 0.11 1.00
4) ICLEI Membership -0.20 0.19 0.31 1.00
5) Public employee capacity -0.06 0.05 0.49 0.11 1.00
6) Fiscal independence -0.07 0.21 -0.07 0.09 -0.04 1.00
7) Professional leadership -0.14 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.15 1.00
8) Median income -0.14 0.34 0.06 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.10 1.00
9) White American race 0.23 0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 0.06 1.00
10) Democrats 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.08 0.17 0.15 1.00
11) Western region -0.28 0.08 0.09 0.21 -0.02 0.06 0.16 0.13 -0.24 0.20 1.00
12) North central region 0.47 -0.02 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -0.10 -0.19 -0.03 0.44 0.20 -0.44 1.00
13) Southern region -0.18 -0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 -0.11 -0.29 -0.50 -0.41 -0.48 1.00
14) Local government type -0.01 0.05 -0.36 0.03 -0.06 0.35 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.09 1.00
15) Density -0.09 0.20 0.10 0.21 0.34 0.17 0.02 0.15 -0.24 0.14 0.12 -0.05 -0.15 0.37 1
Mean 0.05 0.01 10.39 0.20 0.002 0.81 0.69 69558 0.70 0.69 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.78 2194
Standard deviation 0.03 0.01 19.47 0.40 0.002 0.17 0.46 29295 0.21 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.41 2181
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 30731 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.40
Max 0.19 0.07 133 1.00 0.004 1.00 1.00 267332 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 17109
Note: Correlations > |.09| are statistically significant at p<.05
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Results
The multinomial logistic regression results are reported in Table 3.3. The findings
show that the regression model was statistically significant at p<0.001, as noted by the
log likelihood statistic. Additionally, the McFadden R-square for the model was 15.1%,
indicating the model had reasonable good fit.
Our results indicate that compared to local governments that pursue a middle group
strategy, external pressures from different stakeholder groups and internal organizational
capacities were associated with local governments’ pursuit of certain types of
sustainability strategies. More specifically, greater pressures from heavy polluting
industry stakeholders were associated with an increased probability that local
governments pursue a reactive strategy over a middle group strategy (p<0.10). By
contrast, less pressures from new economy industry (p<0.05) and environmental NGO
stakeholders (p<0.05) were associated with an increased probability that local
governments pursue a reactive strategy over a middle group strategy. In addition, less
public employees working for environmental issues (e.g. park and recreation, utilities,
health, etc.) (p<0.01) were also associated with an increased probability that local
governments pursue a reactive sustainability strategy over a middle group strategy. These
findings provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, stating that compared to local
governments that pursue a middle group strategy, local governments with greater
stakeholder pressures from heavy polluting industry stakeholders and weaker
organizational capacities are more likely to adopt a reactive sustainability strategy.
By contrast, greater pressures from new economy industry stakeholders (p<0.10)
were associated with an increased probability that local governments pursue a proactive
sustainability strategy over a middle group strategy. Moreover, local governments’ both
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policy specific capacities, a membership with the external network, ICLEI (p<0.01) and
more public employees (p<0.05), were strongly associated with an increased probability
that local governments pursue a proactive sustainability strategy over a middle group
strategy. Stronger administrative capacities measured by higher fiscal independence in
local governments (p<0.01) and a professional leadership within the appointed executive
government form (p<0.05) were also strongly associated with their pursuit of a proactive
strategy. These findings offer robust evidence for Hypothesis 2, which states that
compared to local governments that pursue a middle group strategy, local governments
with greater stakeholder pressures from new economy industry and environmental NGO
stakeholders, and greater organizational capacities, are more likely to adopt a proactive
sustainability strategy
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Table 3.3
Multinomial logistic regressions predicting each type of local sustainability strategy
Low-Entropy Group Mid-Entropy High-Entropy Group
RRR (S.E.) Marg. Effect(S.E.) (Base) RRR (S.E.) Marg. Effect(S.E.)
Stakeholder Type
Heavy polluting industries 1.05* (0.00) 0.001(.000) 1.00 (0.00)
New economy industries 0.97** (0.01) -0.005(.002) 1.02* (0.01) 0.020 (0.011)
Envt NGOs 0.96** (0.02) -0.006(.003) 1.01 (0.01)
Organizational Capacity
ICLEI membership 0.57 (0.25) 3.15*** (0.66) 1.146(0.211)
Public employee capacity 0.92*** (0.02) -0.133(0.003) 1.02** (0.01) 0.015(0.006)
Fiscal capacity 0.49 (0.26) 3.16*** (1.81) 1.149(0.574)
Professional leadership 0.78 (0.14) 1.59** (0.32) 0.463(0.199)
Control Variables
Household income 1.00 (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) -7.2e-06(2.8e-
06)
White American race 1.01 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00)
Democratic State 0.71 (0.15) 1.65** (0.32) 0.497(0.196)
Western area 0.46** (0.16) -0.163 (0.048) 4.05*** (1.54) 1.398(0.380)
North Central area 0.47** (0.15) -0.131(0. 043) 1.84 (0.71)
Southern area 0.70 (0.25) 2.31** (0.94) 0.837(0.406)
Municipal government 0.36*** (0.11) -0.143(0.042) 0.85 (0.24)
Density 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)
Cons 4.42** (3.26) 0.04*** (0.03)
N 1,146
Likilihood ratio chi2 358.67*** (0.00)
R2 McFadden 0.151
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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Related to control variables, local governments located in the Western or North
Central regions (compared to those located in the North East region) (p<0.05) and in the
government type of municipality (compared to county governments) (p<0.01) were less
likely to pursue a reactive sustainability strategy over a middle group strategy. By
contrast, local governments with higher level of median household income and
Democratic political influences from the state were positively associated with probability
of local governments pursuing a proactive strategy (p<0.05). Moreover, local
governments located in the Western (p<0.01) or Southern regions (p<0.05) were more
likely to pursue a proactive sustainability strategy compared to local governments located
in the North East region.
As an additional robustness check, I ran OLS regression on each dimension of
sustainability strategies, the breadth of environmental issues and number of sustainability
programs. The results are reported in Table 3.4.
F-statistics for all models were significant at p<0.01, indicating that the null effect of
the independent variables could be rejected. The significance of the coefficients indicates
that the factors related with the breadth of environmental issues are similar to the results
in the multinomial logit regression. The results indicate that while external pressure from
the heavy polluting industry was negatively associated with the breadth of environmental
issues, whereas external pressures from new economy industry and environmental NGOs
were positively associated with the design feature. Related to organizational capacities,
both policy specific and administrative capacities were positively associated with the
greater breadth of environmental issues that local governments address in their
sustainability programs. It is interesting to note that while the negative influence of the
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heavy polluting industry was statistically significant for the breadth of environmental
issues (p<0.05), it has no more influence on the number of programs. Overall, these
findings offer evidence additional about the robustness of the relationships. However, as
discussed above, the OLS regression results provide little information about why some
local governments show greater variability in the design feature of their sustainability
programs than, on average, other governments as all the factors appear as significant to
the design feature. For this reason, I put more emphasis on the multinomial logit
regression results explaining why some local governments choose to design their
sustainability programs in a way of either extremely high or low in terms of the breadth
of environmental issues.
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Table 3.4
OLS regressions predicting the Breadth of Environmental Issues and Number of
Programs
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
The breadth of
environmental issues
(OLS)
Number of programs
(OLS)
Coeff (S.E.) Coeff (S.E.)
Stakeholder Type
Heavy polluting industries
-0.003** (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
New economy
Industries 0.018*** (0.00) 0.011*** (0.00)
Envt NGOs 0.017*** (0.00) 0.009*** (0.00)
Organizational Capacity
ICLEI membership 0.680*** (0.10) 0.328*** (0.05)
Public employee capacity 0.001*** (0.00) 0.000* (0.00)
Fiscal capacity 0.468* (0.26) 0.292* (0.16)
Professional leadership 0.320*** (0.09) 0.222*** (0.05)
Control Variables
Household income 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
White American race
-0.007*** (0.00) -0.004*** (0.00)
Democratic State 0.446*** (0.09) 0.248*** (0.05)
Western area 0.828*** (0.19) 0.394*** (0.10)
North Central area 0.600** (0.18) 0.240** (0.09)
Southern area 0.675*** (0.19) 0.301*** (0.10)
Municipal government 0.131 (0.13) 0.037 (0.08)
Density 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Cons 2.338*** (0.36) 2.131*** (0.21)
N 1146 1146
F statistic or Wald chi2 20.22 (0.000) 32.97 (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.241 0.240
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Discussion and conclusion
A significant number of local governments worldwide have developed strategies that
incorporate sustainability principles into their urban management and policies (Fiorino,
2010). However, despite the increasing prevalence of these strategies, their design
variations have not been considered, even though different types of sustainability
strategies are likely to lead to different environmental performance outcomes (Sharma,
2000). This paper responds to these concerns and examines the factors associated with
local governments’ pursuit of different types of sustainability strategies. Findings suggest
that local governments’ pursuit of different types of sustainability strategy is associated
with different pressures from external stakeholders and variations in internal
organizational capacity. I offer at least two contributions to scholarship.
First, I offer important perspective on why local governments develop sustainability
strategies. I suggest that local governments assess their external and internal settings to
frame the decision of which type of sustainability strategy makes most sense for them:
reactive, middle group, and proactive. Doing so takes a significant step beyond assessing
local sustainability programs monolithically (Hawkins et al., 2016; Portney, 2003;
Swann, 2016), and responds to growing concerns that more nuanced examinations are
needed to understand variations in local governments’ sustainability programs and how
these variations affect environmental performance outcomes (Berry & Portney, 2013;
Feiock & Coutts, 2013).
Second findings are relevant to public managers and policy makers. My findings
imply that local governments tend to be reactive in implementing their sustainability
programs when they are subject to greater external pressures in conjunction with weaker
organizational capacities. More specifically, local governments tend to pursue a reactive
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sustainability strategy when they are under greater pressure from heavy polluting industry
stakeholders, along with less pressure from new economy industry and environmental
NGO stakeholders and less public employees working who have information and
knowledge about community’s environmental issues. On the other hand, developing a
proactive sustainability strategy is more likely to rely on organizational capacities in that
their pursuit of the proactive sustainability strategy is strongly associated with all
administrative and policy-specific capacities, while external pressures from new economy
industry stakeholders were relatively weakly influential on their pursuit of a proactive
strategy. These findings imply that to move toward sustainability, local governments may
need to enhance local governments’ internal capacity, in particular policy specific
capacity, while also balancing stakeholders’ interests (Bryson, Cunningham, &
Lokkesmoe, 2002; Nutt & Backoff, 1993). One possible strategy may be establishing
collaborative partnerships with organizations in other sectors, in particular new economy
businesses and environmental NGOs, to enhance their resources and internal
competencies, thereby creating knowledge and information (Lin & Darnall, 2015; Selsky
& Parker, 2005) for designing and implementing sustainability programs. The
collaborative partnerships may also benefit local governments by enabling them to more
effectively respond to external pressures from various stakeholders and therefore improve
the social legitimacy while addressing complex environmental issues that might not
otherwise get addressed (Lin & Darnall, 2015; Selsky & Parker, 2005).
Despite these contributions, this study also has some limitations. First, this study
characterizes sustainability strategies based on a design feature (the breadth of
environmental issues). However, there might be other salient design features to consider,
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such as the diversity of policy instruments, stringency of environmental standards, and
monitoring/enforcement mechanisms. Examining these sorts of design features would
offer a richer explanation about variations in local governments’ sustainability programs.
My hope is that the results of analysis serves as a basis for undertaking future research in
this area as there is still much to learn about how the design of local governments’
sustainability strategies.
Second, while I characterize local governments’ sustainability strategies, I do not
examine how each sustainability strategy relates to actual environmental performance
outcomes. For instance, reactive and middle group strategies may lead to a similar
environmental performance outcome even though middle group sustainability strategies
have greater variation in their breadth of environmental issues. Moreover, middle group
sustainability strategies may lead to similar environmental performance outcomes as
proactive strategies. Prospective research could extend this study by examining how local
governments that pursue different sustainability strategies relate to environmental
performance outcomes. Doing so would take a much needed step toward understanding
of local governments’ sustainability strategies.
77
Chapter 4
HOW DO DIFFERENT TYPES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ SUSTAINABILITY
PROGRAMS RELATE TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOME?
For decades, local governments worldwide have developed a suite of sustainability
programs designed to induce individuals and organizations to collectively improve the
environmental conditions within their jurisdictions (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Lutsey &
Sperling, 2008). However, as their prevalence has increased, so too have questions about
their policy efficacy (Posner and Weisbach, 2010; (Posner & Weisbach, 2010; Wiener,
2007). Critics suggest that local governments face collective action problems in which
they can enjoy the benefits of appearing to address environmental issues (Wiener, 2007)
without necessarily investing the effort to improve the environment (Posner & Weisbach,
2010). These more symbolic sustainability strategies are often developed in reaction to
external stakeholder pressures (K. Engel, 2006), and offer evidence that the decentralized
collective approach to environmental protection lacks merit (Posner & Weisbach, 2010).
Despite these suggestions, as yet, there has been little empirical understanding of
environmental impact of local governments’ sustainability programs (Outka & Feiock,
2011; Sharp et al., 2010). Moreover, existing literature has not considered how program
impact is related to the way in which these programs are constructed in that some local
governments are more likely than others to design their programs in a more
comprehensive manner by addressing a broad array of environmental issues (Sharp et al.,
2010) using a diverse set of policy instruments (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013;
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Hawkins et al., 2016; Swann, 2016). These variations are likely related to differences in
programs’ environmental performance outcomes (Darnall & Kim, 2012).
This paper addresses these issues by considering how the design of 102 county
governments’ individual sustainability programs relates to their improvement of local
environmental outcomes. After controlling for the spillover effects related to the
environmental quality of neighboring counties, my findings offer the evidence that,
indeed, local governments’ sustainability programs are related with improved
environmental conditions. More specifically, local governments that design their
sustainability programs more comprehensively are likely to improve their environmental
quality to a greater extent than local governments whose programs are designed less
comprehensively. These findings are significant because they represent one of the first
empirical studies investigating the environmental impact of local governments’
sustainability programs, and offer promise for the decentralized approach towards
environmental protection. This issue is particularly important given the lack of strong
national and international environmental regulatory regimes. While local governments
are often regarded as being in an ideal position to change individual and organizational
behavior (Ayre & Callway, 2005; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006) because of their authority to
address local concerns, and their ability to mobilize public support for local issues (UN,
1992), as yet, evidence of the efficacy of local governments’ sustainability programs has
been limited. My findings suggest that local governments appear to lead to desirable
environmental outcomes through their sustainability programs, and especially those that
are designed more comprehensively.
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A second contribution of this research is that it expands the discussion of how
program design relates to improved environmental performance outcomes, and is a much
needed step towards pushing local sustainability movement forward. While local
governments heavily depend on non-regulatory policy instruments in implementing
sustainability programs (Fiorino, 1999), prior research has paid relatively little attention
to how these programs are designed and how design is related to program efficacy (Daley
et al., 2013). This research shows that more comprehensively designed programs are
associated with the greater environmental performance outcomes. Findings on the
relationship between the comprehensive design of sustainability programs and local air
quality improvement will contribute to scholarship as well as practitioners as they will
advance the policy debate toward a more productive discussion on how to design local
sustainability programs for better environmental performance outcomes.
Local governments’ sustainability programs
As environmental concerns have shifted from point source pollution generated from
industrial activity to the non-point source pollution that is more diffuse and thus more
difficult to resolve with typical regulations (Fiorino, 1999; Stewart & Wiener, 1992),
local governments worldwide have voluntarily adopted a suite of decentralized
sustainability programs (Daley et al., 2013; Feiock & Coutts, 2013). These programs
usually include incentive- and information-based environmental programs that are
designed to encourage more sustainable behavior from individuals and businesses
(Mckenzie‐Mohr, 2000).They are often more cost-effective than centralized regulatory
policies because local governments can have greater flexibility to tailor their programs to
the environmental preferences of their community (Stewart, 1993).
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Despite their policy potential, many scholars have questioned the efficacy of local
governments’ sustainability programs (Posner & Weisbach, 2010; Wiener, 2007). These
critics suggest that local governments tend to implement sustainability programs in
reaction to external stakeholder pressures for environmental protection (K. Engel, 2006)
rather than out of a genuine interest to improve environmental quality (Krause, 2011). In
yielding to external stakeholder pressures, local governments develop ad-hoc programs
(Krause, 2011; Posner & Weisbach, 2010), that seek to minimize the cost of doing
business within their jurisdictions (Posner & Weisbach, 2010), rather than constructing a
well-planned sustainability strategy. For these reasons, critics suggest that local
governments’ sustainability programs tend to be more symbolic than substantive
(Wiener, 2007)
Other scholars point out that global environmental problems can be addressed by
local governments (Krause, 2011; Lee & Koski, 2012)) by focusing on changing
individual and organizational behavior (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Feiock & Coutts,
2013). These supporters suggest that local-level engagement is key to long-term progress
(Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009) because it can simultaneously
improve environmental quality and facilitate economic and societal transformation
(Outka & Feiock, 2011). Given local government’s proximity to both businesses and
citizens, it has a better understanding of local conditions and can design programs that are
better suited to influence behavior that leads to long term environmental change (Dietz,
Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Kuh, 2008). However, the key leverage point to the success of
these programs may be program design.
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Environmental Performance of Local Governments’ Sustainability Programs
Local public managers consider a variety of design features (Bae & Feiock, 2013;
Daley et al., 2013) when implementing their sustainability programs. One important
design feature is how comprehensively sustainability programs are designed (Daley et al.,
2013; Krause, 2011; Portney, 2003; Swann, 2016), and policy researchers have suggested
that sustainability programs that are design more comprehensively are likely to lead to
greater policy outcomes (Darnall & Kim, 2012). However, despite recognition of the
comprehensiveness as a salient design features for local sustainability programs,
researchers know little about its implications in the context of sustainability program
design. Rather, prior studies examining comprehensiveness of sustainability programs
have typically focused on a summed count of programs (Berry & Portney, 2013; Hawkins
et al., 2016; Krause, 2011; Portney, 2003; Svara, 2011). However, comprehensiveness of
sustainability program has multiple dimensions, in particular across scope of policy
issues and the mix of various policy instruments. For instance, some local governments
may adopt sustainability programs that address a wide number of environmental issues
from waste to land use, whereas others assign the same number of sustainability
programs into a limited number of environmental issues. In other instances, local
governments may adopt sustainability programs that utilize a limited number of policy
instruments, whereas others may adopt the same number of sustainability programs, but
utilize a broader selection of policy instruments. Considering variations in
comprehensiveness of sustainability programs therefore may affect policy outcomes.
However, prior studies have not considered these design issues.
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This paper will add up new dimensions of comprehensive sustainability programs and
discuss how these dimensions could be understood for designing sustainability programs
in local governments. To be specific, I focus on three dimensions to define
comprehensiveness of sustainability programs: number, breadth of policy domains and
breadth of policy instrument types. Although each aspect commonly characterizes
comprehensiveness of a local government’s sustainability programs, each stresses
somewhat different program aspects—namely, the quantity and the content aspects
(Schaffrin, Sewerin, & Seubert, 2015) of their sustainability programs.
The number of sustainability programs is a density or quantity aspect (Schaffrin et al.,
2015), reflecting the degree of organizational intervention or penetration (Knill, Schulze,
& Tosun, 2012) in addressing sustainability issues. As the implementation of local
government’s sustainability programs is neither mandated nor financed by the federal or
state governments, local governments decide how many programs to implement (Krause,
2011; Svara, 2011). Some local governments do not implement any actual sustainability
programs (Krause, 2011), whereas others implement a large set of substantive programs
(Wang et al., 2012). Implementing these programs requires investments of staff time
related to internal coordination, engagement of critical stakeholders, and implementation.
In other instances, these programs might require physical investments of resources related
to infrastructure and public outreach (Wang et al., 2012). Because of these investments,
local governments that adopt a large set of sustainability programs tend to be more
serious about sustainability issues (Portney, 2003). These governments are therefore more
likely to improve the environmental conditions within their community than local
governments that implement only a few programs (Portney, 2003; Svara, 2011).
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The breadth of environmental issues that local governments address in their
sustainability programs represents content aspects (Schaffrin et al., 2015) of their
sustainability programs. Comprehensive sustainability programs integrate a variety of
environmental issues into their sustainability programs, and establish multiple pathways
to address all the related environmental issues (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003). Such an
integrated approach often requires not only inter-organizational coordination across
multiple departments within a government (Krause et al., 2016), (Zeemering, 2009), but
also inter-sectoral coordination across community members, the private and non-profit
sectors (Sharp et al., 2010). While designing sustainability programs across a broader
array of environmental issues is more time intensive and costly than taking a less
comprehensive approach, local governments can achieve greater environmental
performance outcomes by addressing a greater breadth of environmental issues.
The breadth of policy instrument is another dimension of sustainability programs’
content (Howlett, 2009a). Policy instruments are identifiable methods of persuading
individuals or organizations to behave in responsible ways in order to improve a social
outcome (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). The breadth of policy instruments is the extent to
which local governments use a diverse set of policy instruments to address a particular
environmental concern (Sovacool, 2009; Stern, 2000). While some local governments
tend to heavily depend on a few types of policy instruments, others consider the full
range of policy instruments and adopt a mix of policy instruments to that work together
to achieve desired policy outcomes (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). For instance, in
order to encourage pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., energy savings, vehicle use
reduction, recycling), some local governments incorporate drivers of behavior changes
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into their program design (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Mckenzie‐Mohr, 2000) to
influence social norms (e.g., education), establish physical and institutional settings (e.g.,
infrastructure and legal limits), create economic incentives (e.g., tax incentives) and
provide assistance (e.g., public services). This multi-faceted integrative use of policy
instruments tends to address individual and organizational behaviors more systematically
and through multiple pathways. Doing so helps to create sustained change (Yanarella &
Levine, 2008), that leads to more fundamental changes in environmental and social
conditions.
Taken together, comprehensive sustainability programs imply not only adopting more
sustainability programs, but also designing them in more broadly across environmental
issues and policy instruments through the coordination of different policy domains and
policy instruments, all of which will subsequently lead to greater environmental
performance outcomes than the less comprehensive sustainability programs.
Hypothesis) Local governments’ sustainability programs that are designed more
comprehensively are related to greater environmental performance
outcomes in their locality.
Empirical analysis
Data
To assess the environmental performance outcomes of local governments’
sustainability programs, I rely on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s air
quality data. EPA air quality data are collected across the United States, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands (EPA). There are approximately 4,000 EPA repositories of
ambient air quality monitoring stations, and state, local and tribal agencies have
responsibility for collecting the data and submit it to EPA’s Air Quality System on a
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periodic basis (EPA)8. The data includes information for the amount of pollution and
other substances present in the atmosphere, such as ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM10
and PM2.5), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and
lead (Pb). In each year the number of observations for each pollutant is inconsistent, with
CO being the least observed pollutant and ozone being the most observed pollutant.
I relied on the EPA’s ambient ozone concentration because it has the most
observations per year. Moreover, among the other pollutants, ground-level ozone is the
primary component of smog and has significant adverse health effects, such as breathing
problems, asthma or other lung diseases (Agency, 2014). Because of these risks, in 2008,
EPA increased the stringency of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
ozone, from 0.08 to 0.075 ppm (8-hour, annual fourth-highest daily maximum). The
ground-level ozone is mainly caused by emissions from fuel consumption, motor vehicles
and industrial pollutants (Chen & Ye, 2015). In response, local governments developed a
variety of sustainability programs to encourage individuals and organizations to
voluntarily reduce their energy consumption, vehicle use, and other ozone producing
activities. Therefore, in this study I focused on ozone quality as a proxy of local
environmental quality.
The ozone quality data was combined with data from a variety of other sources that
form my explanatory and control variables (discussed below). After the data merge, a
total of 102 county governments remained in the sample. Specific measurements and data
sources are described in the following sections.
8 EPA, accessed on 01/02/2016, at http://www.epa.gov/airdata/ad_basic.html
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Measures
Dependent Variable
To measure the environmental performance of local governments’ environmental
programs, I examine changes in their ambient ozone concentration between 2003 and
2013. These years were selected because in 2005, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement was first initiated by the Seattle Mayor, Greg Nickels. The
agreement declared that local governments should advance the goals of the Kyoto
Protocol, the international agreement to address climate change, through their local
leadership and programs (The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection)9. The
agreement was particularly relevant to U.S. local governments’ voluntary initiatives
because in 2005 the U.S. federal government had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, even
though 141 countries had officially ratified it into law. The agreement prompted many
local governments to initiate a more coordinated effort to address climate change
pollution through the development of decentralized local sustainability programs. Since
then, many local governments’ sustainability activities have begun focusing on air quality
including ozone. While there may be local governments that have undertaken some
environmental programs for sustainability before 2005, they rarely adopted the
sustainability principle as an official policy objective, and therefore their programs were
less likely to be systematically planned and designed in a name of sustainability. For
instance, even though the American Planning Association (APA) established the first
guideline for sustainability planning in 2000, only after 2005 have local governments
9 The U.S. Conference of Mayors, accessed on 04/02/2016,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm.
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officially begun adopting the sustainability principle as their official municipal policy
objective in designing their sustainability programs10. Taken together, by examining data
in 2003, I have a suitable baseline measure. Since many sustainability programs take
years to have an effect, I consider 2013 as a post-implementation year. To assess the
robustness of my findings, I also compared data collected in 2004 and 2014. Since the
results were similar, but data limitations reduced the number of observations, I place
more emphasis on the 2003 and 2013 comparisons.
There were 1,254 monitoring stations that collected ozone quality data in 2003 and
1,370 stations in 2013. As some counties often have more than one monitoring station in
their jurisdiction, the number of unique counties were 708 (2003) and 786 (2013). For
counties that had more than one ozone quality observation in a given year, these
observations were averaged. Ozone quality change was calculated as follows:ℎ = ∆ ( )
10 Eco-Municipalities. Accessed on March 18th 2016. Available at
http://www.instituteforecomunicipalities.org/Eco-municipalities.html
88 Figure 4.1
Ozone quality in 2003 (Left) and 2013 (Right)
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Figure 1 shows spatial distribution of ozone quality in 2003 and 2013, respectively.
The categories in Figure 1 were created according to the level of ozone quality (Anselin
& Gallo, 2006): Good (0.0-0.064ppm), Moderate (0.065-0.084ppm), Unhealthy 1 (0.084-
0.104ppm), and Unhealthy 2 (>0.104ppm). As shown in the Figure 1, in 2003, some
counties in California and most counties in Northern U.S. and North East, in particular
Michigan, Maryland, New York, Virginia, and Georgia show the unhealthy 1 level of
ozone quality which is greater than 0.104ppm. However, in 2013, ozone quality in these
counties were moderate, while other counties in Western area, such as Kings County,
California, Jefferson County, Colorado, Hood County, Texas, and Tarrant County, Texas,
still remain in the unhealthy 1 level of ozone quality.
Figure 4.2
Ozone quality change between 2003 and 2013
While US ozone quality improved across entire area, some counties experienced
greater improvements than others, as shown in Figure 2. When categorizing counties
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according to the degree to which their ozone quality has improved between 2003 and
2013, counties in Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia are among those that experienced
much greater ozone quality improvement (and were in the top 25%) than other counties.
On the other hand, counties in Arizona, California, Colorado, and New Mexico are
among those that experienced much less ozone quality improvement (and were in the
bottom 25%) compared to other counties.
Explanatory Variables
To assess local governments’ sustainability programs, I rely on the data from the
2010 International City/County Management Association (ICMA)’s Local Government
Sustainability Policies and Programs survey. The survey was developed with the input of
ICMA’s Center for Sustainable Communities and other research institutes (Svara, 2011).
The survey asked local governments’ sustainability managers about their jurisdiction’s
sustainability programs. In the summer of 2010, the survey was mailed to sustainability
managers of local governments in jurisdictions having more than 2,500 residents. Total
302 of 1,312 (23.01%) county governments responded (Svara, 2011).11
I considered three measures of a local government’s sustainability programs. While
each measure commonly examines the degree to which its sustainability programs are
designed comprehensively, each measure underscores slightly different dimension of
11 The survey was originally sent to all local governments of which jurisdictions have more than 2,500
population, including counties, cities, and townships. Total 2,176 (25.39%) local governments responded,
in particular 302 counties and 1,874 municipalities– responded (Svara, 2011). However, as this study
focused on ozone quality in county areas only, I included responses from county governments in my
sample.
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their programs: size, the scope of environmental issues that they address, and the mix of
policy instrument types that they use to achieve a policy goal respectively.
The first measure is number of programs, which has been widely used to measure the
degree of local governments’ commitment to addressing sustainability issues (Krause,
2011; Portney, 2003). It was assessed using data obtained by the ICMA survey.
Sustainability managers were provided with a list of 119 sustainability programs. Since
this paper particularly focuses on environmental performance outcomes, sustainability
programs that are related to non-environmental issues (e.g., social inclusion) were
excluded, leading 111 programs. For each of the programs, respondents were asked to
indicate whether or not their local government had implemented them. Responses were
coded 1 if they reponded ‘Yes’, otherwise 0. I then summed the number of programs for
each local government.
The second measure I used to assess the design of a local government’s sustainability
programs is the breadth of environmental issues that are addressed by the programs. For
each of the 111 programs identified in the ICMA survey, respondents were asked to
indicate which actions their local government had taken to reduce seven environmental
impacts: air, water, recycling, energy conservation, buildings, land use, and
transportation. The remaining seven aggregate environmental issues were disaggregated
based on their specific goals and target populations. For example, energy conservation
programs were disaggregated based on their pollution source as sustainability programs
that address more pollution sources have greater breadth (Daley et al., 2013). This step
led to the generation of five types of energy items: energy in government, energy in
residential homes, energy in business, energy in outdoor lights/vehicles, and alternative
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energy generation. Similarly, the aggregate category of transportation was disaggregated
into three types of transportation items based on their pollution source: public
transportation, reduced commute trips (e.g., telework, compressed work week), and
alternative modes of vehicles (e.g., walk, bike). After disaggregation, I identified 13
environmental issues. These 13 environmental issues were the basis for my measure
assessing the breadth of environmental issues. I used Shannon’s H entropy score
(Jacquemin & Berry, 1979) to develop this measure. Shannon’s H entropy score is one of
the most widely used measures to assess the breadth of items because it is sensitive to
high levels of scope and therefore leads to wider variation than other types of breadth
measures (e.g. Herfindahl Hirschman Index) (Halpin & Thomas III, 2012). Local
governments whose sustainability programs address a greater breadth of environmental
issues therefore receive a higher entropy score (EE). Shannon’s H entropy score takes the
following form:
E = P ∗ ln(1/P )
where Pj is a proportion of sustainability programs addressing jth environmental issue
in total adopted sustainable programs, the logarithm of 1/Pj is a weight of each proportion
and m is the number of total available environmental issues, which is in this case 13.
The third measure I used to assess the design of a local government’s sustainability
programs is the breadth of policy instruments that are used in the programs. To account
for the breadth of local governments’ policy instruments, I drew on prior research
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categorizing policy instrument types in the local sustainability program context
(Bengston, Fletcher, & Nelson, 2004; Cubbage, Harou, & Sills, 2007; Dietz et al., 2009;
Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001; Li & Geiser, 2005). In categorizing policy instrument
types, these studies have commonly focused on the mechanism through which a policy
instrument influences individual or organizational behaviors (Dietz et al., 2009;
Kaufmann-Hayoz et al., 2001; Li & Geiser, 2005). Based on this criterion, I identified 12
types of policy instruments comprising the 119 programs in the 2010 ICMA survey:
voluntary agreement, provision of service, establishment of new infrastructure,
infrastructure upgrade, tax benefits, direct financial payment, reduced fees, other
incentives, charges, limit, education, and public procurement. Although these policy
instruments are not completely mutually exclusive, each policy instrument can be
considered a distinctive type because each depends on a different mechanism to influence
behaviors. Definitions and the mechanisms of each policy instrument type are discussed
in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
A typology of policy instruments
Policy Instrument Types Definition Mechanism Examples from the ICMA list
Voluntary agreement Non-binding
commitments to
achieve certain
objectives
Guiding strategic
decisions tied to
overarching
sustainability goal
∙ Energy efficiency rate
∙ GHG reduction targets
∙ Consumption standards
Provision of service Practices,
procedures, or
actions that enable
individuals or
organizations
Assist or promote pro-
environmental
behaviors
∙ E-waste collection service
∙ Commuter rail service
∙ Compressed work week
Infrastructure Establishme
nt
Man-made, mobile
or immobile physical
objects that enable or
promote sustainable
behaviors
Creating new physical
conditions
∙ Establishing bike lanes or sidewalks
∙ Installing charging station for electric
vehicles
∙ New outdoor light fixtures
Upgrade Improving physical
conditions that already
exist
∙ Retrofitting streetlights
∙ Upgrading facilities’ water systems
∙ Widening sidewalks
Economic
Instruments
Tax
benefits
Deduction or
exemption of taxes
paid for certain
activities or services
Economic incentives ∙ Tax credits for conducting energy audit for
residential homes
Direct
payment
Direct provision of
financial subsidies
Economic incentives ∙ Direct grant for home audits
∙ Funding for pre-school education
Reducing
fees
Discount of fees or
prices
Economic incentives ∙ Development rights transfer
∙ Reducing fees for sustainable development
Other
incentive
Others Economic and non-
economic incentives
∙ Incentives for water conservation
∙ Incentives for public employees for taking
mass transit to work, carpool, walk, bike
Charges Prices imposed for
utilizing specific
services
Economic
disincentives
∙ Water price structure to encourage
conservation
∙ Charges based on the amount of waste
discarded
Limit Legal orders that
mandate some forms
of behaviors
Legal institutions ∙ Land use requirements
∙ Zoning codes
∙ Limits on impervious surfaces on private
property
Education Informing,
educating, or
communicating
Social norms ∙ Energy conservation education
∙ Publishing reports on community quality of
life indicators
Public Procurement Public organizations’
purchasing of
products and services
Green consumption
and market driver
∙ Purchasing of fuel efficient vehicles
∙ Restriction on the purchase of bottled water
by governments
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By relying on the definitions and descriptions of the policy instrument types, I
identified a policy instrument type for each of the 111 sustainability programs. Eight
sustainability programs were excluded because their description did not include their
policy instrument types, leading 103 categorized programs. Similarly, I utilized
Shannon’s H entropy score (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979) to measure the breadth of policy
instruments. Local governments whose sustainability programs addressed a greater
breadth of policy instruments therefore received a higher the entropy score (EP).
E = P ∗ ln( 1P )
where Pk is a proportion of sustainability programs addressing kth policy instrument in
total adopted sustainable programs, the logarithm of 1/Pk is a weight of each proportion
and l is the number of total available policy instrument, which is in this case 12.
Control Variables
Local environmental quality is influenced by a variety of factors. First of all,
industrial characteristics are salient factors to affect local environmental quality (Chan &
Yao, 2008; Chen & Ye, 2015) because industrial entities are the main source of local
environmental pollution (Daley et al., 2013). Since the manufacturing industry has been
commonly employed as a proxy for polluting industries (Daley et al., 2013), I accounted
for the size of the manufacturing industry by using NAICS industry codes and 2007
Economic Census data to determine the total number of employees in manufacturing
industry and normalized by the total population of the locality.
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I also controlled for other industry sectors, and especially the new economy industry.
The new economy industry consists of emerging science and technology businesses, and
particularly those associated with information technologies (Hirsch, 2001; Krueger &
Gibbs, 2007). It differs from the manufacturing industry because the new economy
industry’s activities are more likely to generate little pollution and depend on high quality
of labors who are well-educated and who prefer living in environmentally preferable
community (Florida, 2005; Krueger & Gibbs, 2007). Therefore, the size of the new
economy industry is also likely to influence local environmental quality, measured by the
total number of employees in information technology (IT) industry divided by total
population by relying on by using NAICS industry codes and 2007 Economic Census
data.
Environmental NGOs in locality often reflects organized interest in environment
protection in the community (Daley et al., 2013) and therefore influences local
environmental quality. I measured local environmental NGO relevance by the number of
environmental NGOs in a given locality (Daley et al., 2013). I relied on data from the
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to determine the number of
environmental NGOs in a locality.
Local environmental quality is also influenced by local governments’ policy priority
in environmental protection (Daley et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2010). I accounted for
whether a county was a member of the International Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives (ICLEI). ICLEI is one of the most influential networks that assist local
governments’ environmental initiatives, and it has worked for more than a decade to
encourage local governments worldwide to reduce their environmental impacts (Betsill &
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Bulkeley, 2006) through its urban carbon dioxide reduction campaign, green fleets
campaign, and cities for climate protection campaign (Bai, 2007). Local governments that
are a member of ICLEI are therefore more likely to be socialized into having a greater
commitment towards improving environmental quality (Sharp et al., 2010). Using data
obtained from the ICMA 2010 survey, ICLEI membership was coded 1 if the local
government had membership with ICLEI, otherwise coded 0.
Public employees, in particular those who work related to environmental protection,
contribute to local environmental quality because greater public employees are more
capable of identifying and resolving local environmental problems (Krause et al., 2016).
To create this variable, I relied on the 2007 US Census Bureau Local Government
Employment and Payroll data that include information about the number of public
employees across functional areas of natural resources, park and recreations, public
welfare, health, and solid waste management. The number of public employees was
standardized by total population in the locality.
Income and race are also important community characteristics to determine
community’s interest in environmental quality (Edwards & Darnall, 2010). I used 2007
American Community Survey from U.S. Census Bureau to determine each locality’s
median household income and the proportion of Caucasian population.
Local environmental quality is also affected by the state governments. Each state has
different policy priorities in environmental protection and often exerts influence on local
governments’ environmental priorities (Saha & Paterson, 2008). Democratic states
typically support a pro-environmental political agenda, which therefore influences the
overall environmental performance of local governments. To create this variable, I relied
98
on the governor’s political affiliation in 2007. County governments that are located in the
states with Democratic governors were coded 1, otherwise 0.12
I also controlled for whether the county was designated as non-attainment areas by
the EPA to control for influence from the federal government. The EPA designates a
geographic area as a nonattainment area if its air quality fails to meet the NAAQS. Once
a county area is designated as a nonattainment area, the local government should develop
implementation plan about how to attain and maintain the standard by reducing air
pollutant emissions (Greenstone, 2004). Counties that are designated as non-attainment
areas therefore are under greater pressures by EPA to improve local air quality. To
measure this variable, counties that were designated as non-attainment areas for ozone
quality coded 1, otherwise 013.
Vehicle emission is the primary source of urban air pollution (Chen & Ye, 2015). To
control for the number of vehicles in the locality, I relied on US Census’s household
vehicle usage and transportation data to determine the number of privately owned
vehicles in each county in 2007.
Urbanization also affects local air quality because more urbanized localities have
more complicated environmental problems (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013;
Hawkins et al., 2016). To control for urbanization, I consider density measured as
population given geographical size of the locality (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Hawkins et al.,
12 Accessed on March 29, 2016. Multistate Associates Incorporated, 2012 Governors and Legislatures,
http://www.multistate.com/site.nsf/G_L2012?OpenPage.
13Accessed on March 29, 2016. EPA’s Current Nonattainment Counties for All Criteria Pollutants,
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html.
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2016), and the information is drawn from the 2007 US Census American Community
Survey.
Finally, I account for meteorological conditions in the locality such as temperature,
air pressure and precipitation (Chen & Ye, 2015). Among many factors, temperature and
barometric pressure influence movement and the degree of concentration of air
pollutants (Chan & Yao, 2008). By relying on the EPA air quality data, I included
average temperature and average atmospheric pressure of each county in 2013. Since
these control variables described above were included in the model predicting local
governments’ sustainability programs in 2010 due to potential endogeneity issue
(described below), I considered these variables in 2007 except for the two meteorological
variables. Because average temperature and barometric pressure are not expected to
influence local governments’ decision to adopt sustainability programs, I used the most
recently available data for these two variables.
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in
my analysis.
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17)
1) Number 1.00
2) Number*EE 1.00 1.00
3) Number*EP 0.99 0.99 1.00
4) Fiscal constraint -0.35 -0.36 -0.34 1.00
5) Fiscal
independence
-0.16 -0.15 -0.13 0.22 1.00
6) Manufacturing -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 0.31 -0.15 1.00
7) IT Industry 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.13 0.29 -0.28 1.00
8) ICLEI 0.36 0.37 0.37 -0.12 0.02 -0.28 0.19 1.00
9) Democratic state 0.19 0.20 0.20 -0.28 -0.21 -0.04 -0.11 0.22 1.00
10) Public employees -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 0.07 -0.18 -0.09 0.08 1.00
11) Env NGOs 0.39 0.38 0.39 -0.15 -0.09 -0.27 0.27 0.34 0.14 -0.15 1.00
12) Income 0.45 0.44 0.45 -0.12 0.07 -0.31 0.71 0.28 0.15 -0.09 0.44 1.00
13) White_race -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 0.07 0.21 0.40 -0.12 -0.16 0.25 0.14 -0.28 -0.13 1.00
14) # of Vehicle 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 0.25 0.26 -0.07 -0.18 0.79 0.35 -0.38 1.00
15) Density 0.32 0.31 0.33 -0.10 0.15 -0.21 0.48 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 0.47 0.51 -0.29 0.43 1.00
16) Temperature 0.20 0.19 0.19 -0.12 0.03 -0.32 -0.09 0.17 -0.15 0.03 0.22 -0.08 -0.42 0.32 0.16 1.00
17) Barometric
Pressure
-0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.37 0.05 0.07 -0.24 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.14 0.05 0.18 0.29 1.00
Mean 29.58 63.24 50.56 0.40 0.70 51.05 11.63 0.18 0.74 0.004 33.77 73,280 71.61 204,541 693.03 14.38 739.07
S.D. 16.58 42.14 34.47 0.49 0.16 29.31 6.00 0.38 0.44 0.009 34.03 19,012 18.22 265,116 1,036.5
8
5.98 36.16
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 9.97 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 40,571 30.69 4,484 5.30 0.03 603.26
Max 74.00 185.97 149.74 1.00 1.00 130.80 35.74 1.00 1.00 0.07 180.00 131,05
4
98.66 1,644,65
3
7,993.6
0
44.35 770.40
Correlations > |.20| are statistically significant at p<.05
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Empirical Model
To empirically examine the relationship between local sustainability programs and
ozone quality within a locale, spatial dependence in ozone quality among neighboring
counties becomes an important issue to be addressed (Chen & Ye, 2015). Spatial
dependence occurs “when the value of the dependent variable corresponding to each
cross-sectional unit is assumed to depend on a weighted average of that dependent
variable corresponding to neighbouring cross-sectional units” (Kelejian & Prucha, 1998),
p.99). Hence, in the presence of spatial dependence, the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimator is typically not consistent (Anselin & Gallo, 2006).
In the presence of spatial dependence (Chen & Ye, 2015), the spatial autoregressive
disturbance (SARAR) model has been widely employed (Drukker, Prucha, & Raciborski,
2013), which takes a form as following:= + + + , (1)= + , (2)
where is the dependent variable, represents the independent variables that
contain exogenous covariates, represents the independent variables that contain
endogenous covariates, W and M are × spatial-weighting matrices that parameterize
the distance between neighborhoods. is spatially correlated residuals, whereas ϵ is
independent and identically distributed disturbances (Drukker et al., 2013). λ and ρ are
scalars that measure, respectively, the dependence of on nearby y and the spatial
correlation in the errors (Anselin & Gallo, 2006). The weighted average of the dependent
variable values observed for other cross sectional units, , is typically referred to as a
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spatial lag, whereas the weighted average of disturbances, , is a spatial error (Anselin
& Gallo, 2006; Drukker et al., 2013).
The spatial autoregressive disturbance (SARAR) model allows for the disturbances to
be generated by a spatial autoregressive process (Anselin & Gallo, 2006; Chen & Ye,
2015; Kelejian & Prucha, 1998) by including spatial lags of other localities’ dependent
variable values in a model as the exogenous independent variables, as shown in the
equation (1). In other words, it includes the spatial lag variable for to be dependent on
nearby y. It also addresses the issues of heteroskedasticity that shows the spatial
dependence in the disturbances by allowing the disturbances to be generated by a spatial
autoregressive process (Drukker et al., 2013), as shown in equation (2). Setting ρ = 0
yields the simple spatial lag model (equation (1)) = + + + as = ,
while setting λ = 0 yields the spatial error correction model (equation (2)). Setting ρ = 0
and λ = 0 causes the model to reduce to a linear regression model as there is no spatial
dependence existing in either the dependent variable or the disturbances (Drukker et al.,
2013). Therefore, the spatial autoregressive disturbance (SARAR) model simultaneously
estimates outcomes by controlling for the spatial dependence among unobservables in the
dependent variable, exogenous variable and error terms }(Drukker et al., 2013).
To estimate the spatial models, it is important to specify the spatial weights matrix, W
and M. The spatial weights matrix is usually specified for each location,ω , , (Anselin &
Gallo, 2006) (Chen & Ye, 2015). One of the most widely used spatial weight scheme is
the inverse geographical distance between the centroid of and the centroid of
, represented by , , which takes a following form (Anselin & Gallo, 2006;
Chen & Ye, 2015):
103
, = 1,
The weights matrix is also row-standardized, such that ∑ w = 1 (Anselin and
Gallo, 2006).
Related to ozone quality in county areas, since a county’s ozone quality is expected to
be influenced by the transported ozone from neighboring counties (Chen & Ye, 2015),
improvement (or deterioration) of a county’s ozone quality is affected by ozone quality
change in neighboring counties. Thus, air pollution from neighboring counties is
measured using a spatially-weighted ozone quality in neighboring counties that depends
on physical distance between counties because air pollutants can transport from one
locality to other localities (Anselin & Gallo, 2006). Following the spatial dependence
specification (Chen & Ye, 2015), a county’s air quality improvement may depend on air
quality in surrounding counties, a county government’s sustainability programs, and its
socioeconomic and meteorological characteristics as following:∆ = ∆ + + + , (1)= + , (2)
For the spatial weight matrix, I assign the value of the weights assigned equals the
inverse geographical distance between and , , (Chen & Ye, 2015).
Therefore, the greater weight is assigned to , if it is surrounded by counties that
are located in closer distance and have higher level of ozone quality.
In order to examine how varying design features of sustainability programs are
related to environmental performance, I run three empirical models with different
sustainability program variables that incorporate different design features into its
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measurement. Specifically, in model (1), I include the number of local sustainability
programs a basic model. In models (2) and (3), I include the breadth of environmental
issues and breadth of policy instrument types, respectively. By examining coefficients
associated with the sustainability program in each model, I can identify whether or not
the sustainability programs that are designed more comprehensively in terms of number,
environmental issues and policy instrument are associated with greater ozone quality
changes. Since each sustainability program measure was scored in a different units (e.g.
count and rate) and has a different distribution (e.g. Poisson and normal distribution), it is
difficult to compare the relative extent to which each measure relates to ozone quality
change. One possible alternative is to transform each measure into a standardized score,
z-score. A z-score expresses how far a value is from the population mean, and expresses
this difference in terms of the number of standard deviations by which it differs
(Lundberg, 2007). The standardized score will allow calculating the probability of a score
occurring within normal distributions and enable comparing scores that are from different
units and distributions (Lundberg, 2007). In addition, it provides standardized
coefficients, which allows me to discern whether or not the design features are associated
with greater ozone quality changes. The estimated coefficients do not have the same
interpretation as in a simple linear model because an explanatory variable has a direct
effect and an indirect effect through a spatial lag of the dependent variable, implying its
impact occurs simultaneously (Anselin & Gallo, 2006). Therefore, in this paper, I focus
on the direction and relative magnitude of the coefficients in interpreting the results.
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RESULTS
Environmental Performance of Local Governments’ Sustainability Programs
The findings show that county governments’ sustainability programs have contributed
to improving ozone quality in their community. The pseudo R-squares for models
assessing ozone quality improvements associated with local governments’ sustainability
programs were approximately 46%, but slightly different according to measures of
sustainability programs. More specifically, the pseudo R-square is 46% for the model (1)
that assesses the ozone quality improvement by using number of sustainability programs
as a program measure. The model fit is almost same for the model (2), 47%, that includes
the program measure that is the breadth of environmental issues that are addressed by the
programs. However, the model (3) assessing ozone quality improvement by using the
breadth of policy instrument types as a program measure has slightly lower R-squares,
38%.
The results indicate that that there are strong spillover effects in local environmental
performance in that ozone quality changes in a county area is influenced by ozone quality
changes in neighboring counties. More specifically, the coefficient estimates of the
spatially weighted dependent variable, lamda, show evidence of positive spatial lag in the
all three model specifications (p<0.01). However, the spatial error, rho, is not statistically
significant, meaning disturbance terms are not spatially autocorrelated.
Despite the spatial dependence, individual local government’s sustainability efforts
are related to improvements in its environmental quality. As shown in the Table 4.3, the
estimated coefficients of the local sustainability programs are associated (p<0.01) with
reductions in ozone level across all three models. More specifically, as shown in model
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(1), more sustainability programs in a county government are associated with greater
reduction in ozone level between 2003 and 2013 (p<0.01).
The results in the model (2) also indicate that the design of local governments’
sustainability program is related to improvement in its environmental quality, implying
that sustainability programs that address environmental issues more broadly are related
with greater reduction in ozone level between 2003 and 2013 (p<0.01).
In model (3), I consider a different measure of the comprehensive program design
feature: how broad types of policy instruments are used in sustainability programs. The
coefficient estimate of the local sustainability programs is still statistically significant at
1% level. The results indicate that sustainability programs that use policy instruments
more broadly are associated with greater reduction in ozone level between 2003 and 2013
(p<0.01). Taken together, these findings offer strong support of my hypothesis, which
state that local governments’ sustainability programs that are designed more comprehensively
are related to greater environmental performance outcomes in their locality.
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Table 4.3
Spatial autoregressive estimation results: Basic model
Ozone quality change
(2013 – 2003)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Number of programs
-0.28*** (0.09)
Breadth of
environmental issues
(EE) -0.32*** (0.08)
Breadth of policy
instrument(EP) -0.23** (0.09)
Heavy polluting
industry -0.18** (0.08) -0.18** (0.08) -0.15** (0.08)
New economy industry -0.41*** (0.12) -0.36*** (0.11) -0.37*** (0.12)
ICLEI membership 0.12 (0.16) 0.08 (0.15) 0.07 (0.16)
Democratic state -0.02 (0.08) -0.03 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08)
EPA nonattainment area 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11) 0.09 (0.11)
Public employees -0.05 (0.09) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.09)
Environmental NGOs -0.13 (0.13) -0.13 (0.13) -0.14 (0.13)
Median income 0.32** (0.16) 0.26* (0.15) 0.28* (0.16)
White race -0.09 (0.09) -0.16* (0.09) -0.11 (0.10)
# of Vehicles 0.01 (0.13) 0.04 (0.13) 0.05 (0.13)
Density 0.18 (0.11) 0.16 (0.11) 0.17 (0.12)
Mean temperature -0.08 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.08)
Mean barometric
pressure -0.20** (0.09) -0.22*** (0.08) -0.20** (0.09)
_cons 0.17*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05)
Obs 102 102 102
Squared Correlation
(R2) 0.48 0.50 0.47
Lamda (Spatial lag) 7.36*** (1.09) 7.06*** (1.06) 7.39*** (1.10)
Rho (Spatial error)
-4.40 (2.86) -4.76* (2.47) -4.74* (2.46)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Related to the control variables, a county’s industrial characteristics are associated
with ozone quality change. More specifically, counties with greater number of employees
working in manufacturing industry (p<0.01 – p<0.05) and in new economy industry
(p<0.01) experience greater reductions in ozone level between 2003 and 2013. By
contrast, median household income was negatively associated with the ozone quality
improvement between 2003 and 2013, meaning that the higher the income in the county
area, the less the ozone quality improvement in the county area (p<0.05). Moreover, the
more urbanized county area has experienced less ozone quality improvement between
2003 and 2013 (p<0.1). Finally, higher barometric pressure is associated with greater
reduction in ozone quality level in the locality (p<0.01 – p<0.05).
To examine the robustness of my empirical results, I also ran a model including
different combinations of these comprehensive sustainability program measures: both
number of programs and entropy score for the breadth of environmental issues in model
(1), both number of programs and entropy score for the breadth of policy instrument in
model (2), and all three measures in model (3). Since the entropy scores are highly
correlated with number of sustainability programs, I used the standardized entropy scores
that divide entropy scores by logged number of programs, thereby addressing high
correlation issue between number of programs and entropy scores in that their correlation
score become approximately 0.11 (p>0.1). The analysis results are summarized in the
Table 4.4.
The results are consistent in that local governments implementing more sustainability
programs are associated with greater ozone quality improvements between 2003 and
2013 as indicated from the statistically significant coefficients of the number of programs
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across all three models (p<0.01). The findings in model (1) also suggest that even after
controlling for the number of programs, greater breadth of environmental issues covered
in a local government’s sustainability programs is associated with greater improvement
of ozone quality in that locality (p<0.05). In other words, even for local governments that
adopt a similar number of programs, they could expect greater environmental
performance outcomes by designing them in a broader array of environmental issues.
However, as shown in model (2), breadth of policy instrument is not necessarily related
to greater environmental performance outcomes when controlling for the number of
sustainability programs.
Table 4.4
Spatial autoregressive estimation results: Nested model
Ozone quality change
(2013 – 2003)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Number of programs
-0.27*** (0.08) -0.29*** (0.08) -0.27*** (0.08)
Breadth of
environmental issues (EE) -0.16** (0.08) -0.14 (0.08)
Breadth of policy
instrument(EP) -0.10 (0.07) -0.05 (0.08)
Heavy polluting industry -0.18** (0.08) -0.18** (0.08) -0.18** (0.08)
New economy industry -0.38*** (0.11) -0.39*** (0.11) -0.38*** (0.11)
ICLEI membership 0.08 (0.15) 0.09 (0.15) 0.09 (0.15)
Democratic state -0.04 (0.08) -0.03 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08)
EPA nonattainment area 0.07 (0.11) 0.05 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11)
Public employees -0.04 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08)
Environmental NGOs -0.15 (0.13) -0.14 (0.13) -0.15 (0.13)
Median income 0.28* (0.15) 0.32** (0.15) 0.29* (0.15)
White race -0.15 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09)
# of Vehicles 0.06 (0.12) 0.05 (0.13) 0.05 (0.12)
Density 0.17 (0.11) 0.17 (0.11) 0.17 (0.11)
Mean temperature -0.03 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07)
Mean barometric pressure -0.22*** (0.08) -0.20** (0.08) -0.21*** (0.08)
_cons 0.17*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.05)
Obs 102 102 102
Squared Correlation (R2) 0.50 0.50 0.51
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Lamda (Spatial lag) 7.08*** (1.05) 7.28*** (1.06) 7.12*** (1.05)
Rho (Spatial error)
-5.10* (2.70) -4.96* (2.64) -5.35* (2.76)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Local Governments’ Sustainability Programs as Endogenous Variables
In exploring the relationship between a local government’s sustainability programs
and its environmental performance, it is necessary to consider the endogeneity issue that
results from the unobserved factors related to both a local government’s decision to adopt
sustainability programs and its environmental performance. To address this potential
problem, I accounted for the factors that might affect local governments’ decisions to
voluntarily adopt sustainability programs. The literature suggests that a local
government’s fiscal condition is an important factor that leads to its decision related to
sustainability programs (Wang et al., 2012) in that local governments are more likely to
undertake the voluntary initiatives when they feel less constrained by fiscal rules and
resources (Wang et al., 2012). However, a local government’s fiscal condition is believed
to be unrelated to ozone quality change in its locality. Therefore, in the baseline analysis,
I instrumented the local sustainability program variable using fiscal condition variables.
For the instrumental variable, I consider two fiscal condition measures: a fiscal
constraint (Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011) and fiscal independence (Ji et al., 2015).
Related to a fiscal constraint, a local government’s fiscal condition is inextricably linked
to state government’s fiscal policy that influences local government’s fiscal capacity (Ji
et al., 2015; Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011). For instance, some states have a debt limit
provision in their fiscal rules, which imposes legal constraints on both the state and local
governments in borrowing to cover their chronic deficits. These provisions therefore
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exert legal pressures on local governments to be more fiscally balanced (Mahdavi &
Westerlund, 2011). Under the fiscal constraint, local governments are less likely to
conduct large investment (Ji et al., 2015) that is more likely to incur (long-term) deficits
(Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011). In other words, in such fiscally constrained situation,
local governments are less likely to undertake new urban policies and services that are
neither mandated nor financed (Ji et al., 2015), such as sustainability programs.
Therefore, I considered if a county government is constrained by the debt limit provision
as a fiscal constraint. The fiscal constraint was coded 1 if the state government where the
county government is located has the provision of debt limit in its fiscal policy, and 0
otherwise. The information is drawn from Mahdavi and Westerlund’s (2011) summary of
state Balance Budget Requirement (BBR).
Local government’s fiscal independence is the extent to which governments secure
financial base from their own revenue sources (e.g. taxes, public service fees and
charges) rather than intergovernmental aids (Ji et al., 2015). Securing greater revenues
from their own revenue sources enhance local governments’ autonomy to initiate new
urban policies and services that are not earmarked by the intergovernmental revenues
(Oates, 1999). Therefore, greater fiscal independence in a local government may create
more stable fiscal conditions for the local government to implement sustainability
programs. I calculated fiscal independence by subtracting intergovernmental revenues
from general revenues and then divide the remaining revenue by general revenues of a
locality. Financial information of local governments was obtained from US Census
Bureau’s 2007 Government Finance data that includes information about each local
government’s revenues and expenditures from different sources.
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In addition to these instrument variables, all of the control variables described earlier
were included in the program adoption models. However, since the two meteorological
variables, average temperature and barometric pressure, are not expected to be related to
a local government’s decision to adopt sustainability programs, they are not included.
Moreover, since the spatial autoregressive disturbance (SARAR) model does not provide
the first stage results, I conducted the two stage least square (2SLS) model (Wooldridge,
2003) to gain the first stage results predicting local governments’ adoption of
sustainability programs, and to calculate statistics for checking validity of the selected
instrumental variables. The 2SLS model projects the fitted values of local governments’
sustainability program by using the instrument variables in the first stage, which will be
used as regressors (Wooldridge, 2003) in the second stage to estimate its relationship
with environmental performance outcomes. It therefore allows me to gain the first stage
results that are projected using the selected instrumental variables, and provides the
statistics for validity of the selected instrument variables.
Local Governments’ Sustainability Program Adoption
The estimated coefficients of a county’s sustainability programs are presented in
Table 4.5. In order to check validity of the instrumental variables, I conduct the Wu-
Hausman F test for checking whether or not the instrumental variables are weak, and the
validity of the instruments is supported (p<0.01).
The results illustrate that local governments’ fiscal conditions are influential on local
governments’ decisions to implement sustainability programs. In model (1) to (3), the
existence of the fiscal constraint was negatively associated with county governments’
sustainability programs (p<0.05). Related to fiscal independence, the results indicate that
113
greater fiscal independence in a county government was negatively associated with their
implementation of sustainability programs (p<0.05 – p<0.1) except for the sustainability
programs that are designed more broadly across environmental issues.
Table 4.5
Predicting county governments’ sustainability program implementation
Local sustainability
programs
Number of
programs
Breadth of
environmental
issues
Breadth of
policy
instruments
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Fiscal Constraint
-0.20** (0.09) -0.18** (0.09) -0.18** (0.09)
Fiscal Independence
-0.22** (0.11) -0.17 (0.11) -0.20* (0.11)
Heavy polluting industry
-0.17* (0.09) -0.17* (0.09) -0.17* (0.09)
New economy industry 0.18 (0.24) 0.20 (0.26) 0.19 (0.25)
ICLEI membership 0.17 (0.10) 0.18** (0.10) 0.18* (0.10)
Democratic state 0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (0.10) 0.00 (0.10)
EPA nonattainment area
-0.08 (0.14) -0.02 (0.14) -0.08 (0.14)
Public employees
-0.15 (0.15) -0.08 (0.15) -0.15 (0.15)
Environmental NGOs 0.20 (0.14) 0.14 (0.14) 0.20 (0.15)
Median income
-0.12 (0.08) -0.11 (0.09) -0.12 (0.08)
White race 0.00 (0.13) -0.08 (0.14) -0.02 (0.14)
# of Vehicles 0.09 (0.07) 0.07 (0.08) 0.12 (0.08)
Density
-0.02 (0.09) -0.01 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09)
_cons
-0.22 (0.11) -0.17 (0.11) -0.20 (0.11)
Obs 102 102 102
R-Squared 0.44 0.44 0.43
Wu-Hausman F test for
endogeneity
3.87** (0.05) 4.17** (0.04) 4.33** (0.04)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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While prevalence of new economy industry had no statistically significant influences,
prevalence of heavy polluting industry was negatively associated with county
governments’ sustainability programs in all three models (p<0.1). ICLEI membership
was positively associated with county governments’ sustainability programs, and
especially those county governments implementing sustainability programs across a
broader array of environmental issues (p<0.05) and policy instruments (p<0.1).
Table 4.6
Two stage spatial autoregressive estimation results
Ozone quality change
(2013 – 2003)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Number of programs
-0.41*** (0.11)
Breadth of
environmental issues
(EE) -0.38*** (0.11)
Breadth of policy
instrument(EP) -0.52*** (0.12)
Heavy polluting
industry -0.21** (0.08) -0.19** (0.08) -0.18*** (0.07)
New economy industry
-0.43*** (0.12) -0.35*** (0.11) -0.36*** (0.12)
ICLEI membership 0.01 (0.09) -0.02 (0.08) -0.01 (0.09)
Democratic state
-0.04 (0.09) -0.05 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08)
EPA nonattainment area 0.07 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11)
Public employees
-0.13 (0.13) -0.13 (0.13) -0.13 (0.13)
Environmental NGOs 0.14 (0.16) 0.08 (0.15) 0.07 (0.15)
Median income 0.36** (0.16) 0.25* (0.15) 0.34** (0.16)
White race
-0.12 (0.09) -0.19** (0.10) -0.21** (0.10)
# of vehicles
-0.01 (0.13) 0.04 (0.13) 0.06 (0.12)
Density 0.20 (0.12) 0.15 (0.11) 0.20* (0.12)
Mean temperature
-0.08 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.07)
Mean barometric
pressure -0.20** (0.09) -0.23*** (0.08) -0.22*** (0.08)
_cons 0.18*** (0.05) 0.16*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.04)
Obs 102 102 102
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Squared Correlation
(R2) 0.46 0.47 0.38
Lambda (Spatial lag) 7.37*** (1.08) 6.90*** (1.07) 7.42*** (1.01)
Rho (Spatial error)
-4.99 (3.12) -4.91** (2.48) -12.46*** (2.34)
Instrumented variable Number of programs Breadth of
environmental Issue
Breadth of policy
instrument
Instrumental variables Fiscal independence,
Fiscal constrain
Fiscal
independence,
Fiscal constrain
Fiscal
independence,
Fiscal constrain
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Even after treating local governments’ sustainability programs as endogeneous
variables through the two stage process, the substantive results remained exactly same as
shown in Table 4.6. Magnitude of the corresponding coefficients of local governments’
sustainability programs even increase. Overall, these findings offer evidence about the
strength of the relationships I examine and additional support for each of the hypotheses,
and in particular, the relationship between local government’s sustainability effort and
collective environmental quality improvement.
Discussion
When effective, local governments can play an important role in global
environmental governance (Fiorino, 2010) particularly in an era where supportive
national and international regime has been absent (Potoski, 2015). This study presents the
first empirical investigation of the environmental impact of sustainability programs in
102 US county governments. Overall, the results show that compared to local
governments that adopt fewer sustainability programs, local governments that adopt more
sustainability programs are likely to experience more improved ozone quality. Even for
local governments that adopt a same number of programs, these locales could expect
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greater ozone quality improvements by designing their programs more comprehensively
across a broad array of environmental issues and policy instruments.
My findings offer three important policy implications for moving local environmental
protection effort forward. First, they provide an optimistic view about the decentralized,
non-regulatory policy approach to improving collective environmental quality.
Increasingly, scholars have dismissed the decentralized environmental protection efforts
by individual local government (Wiener, 2007), suggesting that they are merely symbolic
gestures that create the appearance that government is addressing environmental
problems rather than substantive policy actions (Posner & Weisbach, 2010). In other
instances, scholars have questioned the role of local governments in addressing global
environmental problems (K. Engel, 2006; Michaels, 2008; Posner & Weisbach, 2010;
Wiener, 2007). However, this study offers evidence of the environmental impact of local
governments’ sustainability programs and suggests that local governments can play an
important role in generating substantial environmental performance from their voluntary
actions.
Second, my findings show that local governments can reduce their environmental impacts
further if they address a broader array of environmental issues and using more diverse set of
policy instruments in their sustainability programs. While previous literature has underscored the
importance of the comprehensive approach to sustainability programs (Bae & Feiock, 2013;
Daley et al., 2013; Krause, 2011), as yet, there has been very little understanding about its
implications to designing sustainability programs. This paper characterizes both quantity and
content aspects of comprehensive sustainability programs, and finds its relationship with actual
environmental performance outcomes. These findings provide empirical evidence for the
importance of comprehensiveness as a salient feature to designing local sustainability programs
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(Bae & Feiock, 2013; Daley et al., 2013; Krause, 2011). My findings also reinforce the notion
that local governments could have an important role in designing effective environmental
programs based on their own local knowledge and expertise (Ayre & Callway, 2005; Betsill &
Bulkeley, 2006). Innovative environmental programs are more likely to be designed at the local
level compared to the state and federal level because of less political resistance, smaller scale of
investment needed, greater feasibility to collaborate with local businesses, NGOs, and community
groups for better policy alternatives (Ayre & Callway, 2005; Daley et al., 2013). Moreover, their
distinctive authorities to provide a variety of public services enable them to experiment with
different types of policy instruments across a broad range of policy areas, from recycling to land
use, and tailor them for better environmental performance outcomes.
Finally, this study finds the strong and positive spatial dependence in ozone quality
improvements, suggesting that spillover effects may exist in local governments’
sustainability efforts. That is, the environmental performance created from one county’s
policy effort may benefit other counties. The findings point to the importance of
horizontal collaborations among neighboring governments through strategic alliances and
regional networks (Feiock, 2013) to achieve superior environmental performance
outcomes over time. While in the short term, local governments may also benefit from
improved environmental quality within their communities, in the long run, these
uncoordinated efforts may lead to inefficient outcomes because of their fragmented
approaches (Feiock, 2013) associated with neighboring counties that continue to pollute.
My findings provide public managers and policy makers with important policy
implications about the importance of coordinating their local sustainability efforts.
Despite these contributions, this study also has some limitations. First, my research is
bounded by relatively small sample size, 102 county governments. Since I rely on
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ICMA’s sustainability program survey to measure county governments’ sustainability
programs, sample group was limited to those responding to this survey. Future research
would benefit by including more observations from municipalities, townships, and other
types of local governments, while carefully matching their geographic jurisdictions with
locations of EPA’s air quality stations.
Moreover, the findings are somewhat constrained in their ability to determine casual
relationships between presence of sustainability programs and changes in environmental
quality over time because the ICMA survey data are limited in their ability to
demonstrate a temporal order of sustainability programs. As local sustainability research
has relatively short history, there has been very little scholarly effort to collect
longitudinal data to examine changes in sustainability programs within a local
government. For a more systematic analysis on the impact of local governments’
sustainability programs, more panel data analyses are needed, even though the data
demands for such studies can be significant. This paper helps set that stage by conducting
the preliminary analysis using cross sectional data on local governments’ sustainability
programs.
Finally, this study identifies two distinctive design features that are related to
environmental performance outcomes, the breadth of environmental issues and the
breadth of policy instrument types. However, there might be other salient design features
to consider, such as stringency of environmental standards, monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. Examining these sorts of design features would offer a richer explanation
about variations in local governments’ sustainability effort and more accurate prediction
of their environmental performance outcomes. My hope is that the results of this analysis
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serves as a basis for undertaking future research in this area as there is still much to learn
about how the design of local governments’ sustainability programs.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This research investigates the research question of (1) how design features of
sustainability programs vary across US local governments, (2) which factors influence
variations in program design, (3) how these factors are related to environmental quality
outcomes in communities. My findings suggest that pressures from external stakeholders
and variations in local governments’ organizational capacities are related to local
governments’ decisions to purse different types of sustainability strategies, which
subsequently affect their environmental performance outcomes.
In my first essay, by assessing 70 local governments’ sustainability programs, I find
that although local governments might adopt the same number of sustainability programs,
these programs are designed very differently. Some local governments design their
sustainability programs more narrowly by focusing on a more limited number of
environmental issues (e.g., recycling and internal government energy use) and
constraining their policy instrument types (e.g., provision of services and infrastructure
upgrade). However, other local governments design their sustainability programs more
broadly by focusing on more environmental issues and incorporating more diverse types
of policy instruments to address them. Findings suggest that local governments’
sustainability programs are not designed equivalently.
The results of my first essay are a foundation for my second essay, which examines
the question of why local governments pursue different types of sustainability strategies
that lead to variations in design features of their sustainability programs. Building on
previous management literature on organization’s voluntary environmetnal strategy, I
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categorized local governments into three types of sustainability strategies: reactive,
middle-group, and proactive. By assessing the sustainability strategies of 1,146 US local
governments, I find that pressures from new economy stakeholders, along with more
robust organizational capacities are associated with local governments pursuing a
proactive sustainability strategy (designing sustainability programs across greater breadth
of environmental issues). On the other hand, external pressures from stakeholders in
heavy polluting industries and limited organizational capacities are associated with local
governments pursuing a reactive sustainability strategy (designing sustainability
programs across narrower breadth of environmental issues). These findings imply that
local governments assess their external and internal settings to frame their decision of
which type of sustainability strategy makes most sense for them.
Finally, in my third essay, I provide the first empirical evidence of the environmental
impact that local governments’ sustainability programs have by analyzing 102 US county
governments. Additionally, I find that for local governments that adopt the same number
of programs, those that design their programs more comprehensively by addressing a
broader array of environmental issues and using a more diverse set of policy instruments
are more likely to improve their environmental conditions. These findings imply that
local governments that pursue a proactive sustainability strategy (with more sustainability
programs that cover a broader array of environmental issues and more diverse policy
instruments) may lead to greater environmental performance outcomes compared to those
pursuing other types of sustainability strategies.
Taken together, my dissertation responds to the increasing questions being asked by
scholars and practitioners about why some local governments’ sustainability programs
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have been successful, while others have not. Given the importance of program design and
its link with improved sustainability performance (Darnall & Kim, 2012), my findings
have important implications for distinguishing among local governments’ sustainability
strategies. These differences might otherwise go unnoticed if I focused exclusively on the
number of programs that they implement (Schaffrin et al., 2015).
My research also responds to growing concerns that more nuanced examinations are
needed to understand variations in local governments’ sustainability programs and how
these variations affect environmental performance outcomes (Feiock & Coutts, 2013).
My findings offer an optimistic view about the decentralized, non-regulatory policy
approach that some US governments are using to improve environmental conditions in
their local areas, and especially local governments that pursue proactive sustainability
strategies. These findings reinforce the notion that when effective, local governments can
play an important role in global environmental governance (Fiorino, 2010) particularly in
an era where supportive national and international regime has been absent (Potoski,
2015). My research helps advance the policy debate toward a more productive discussion
on how to design local sustainability programs for better policy outcomes.
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